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Abstract 
 
Countries in southern Africa have been implementing economic liberalisation policies for 
over two decades, with the aim of reversing years of economic decline. This process of 
economic liberalisation has been largely been influenced by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank policy prescription. While the developed world has been 
piling pressure on countries in the Sub-Saharan region to integrate their national 
economies into the global economic, different countries have responded differently in 
opening up their economies. For some, the new economic policy regime has entailed a 
shift from a state-run economy and focusing more on a free market economy. While 
some countries have taken a cautious approaching to economic liberalisation, Zambia 
went for rapid liberalisation, which has led to negative social consequences on 
employment and the livelihoods of the working class.  Through the adoption and 
implementation of labour market flexibility policies, Zambia and other countries in the 
region have seen an upswing in new forms of employment such as casual labour, sub-
contracting and temporary employment, which have no protection and have exposed 
workers to exploitation. Employment levels have also dropped as the capitalist investors 
shed off massive numbers of workers in order to reduce labour costs. Local 
manufacturing industries, in most cases, have been forced to close down and lay-off 
workers due to unfair competition with cheap imported goods. Liberalisation in 
developing countries in general and southern Africa in particular, has entailed weakening 
the role of the state in national economic management. Governments are increasingly 
succumbing to the dictates of multinationals and are failing to enforce regulatory 
measures needed to protect the welfare of workers and their working conditions.    
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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
The last two decades has seen most developing countries implementing economic 
restructuring measures in order to reverse years of economic decline. The Southern 
Africa region has been no exception to this process of restructuring. The economic 
transformation has involved the adoption of economic measures that aim at helping to 
correct the structural weaknesses of the economies of the countries in the region. These 
measures have, in large part, been an adoption of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank policy prescription. As a strategy for growth, it has been common for 
new governments to liberalise their economies by taking measures which have included, 
among others, the deregulation of foreign investment, liberalised imports, removal of 
currency controls, reduction in the role of the state and privatisation of former state 
enterprises. Before the popularisation of the free market economy, African economies 
were heavily regulated by the state with trade restrictions and other limitations firmly in 
place.  The demise of the socialist system and the end of the Cold War has also had 
fundamental implications on countries that followed that type of model, triggering a 
transition towards market economies.  
All these changes have been taking place under the ambit of a process of globalisation 
which, according to Stiglitz (2002), has been characterised by the removal of barriers and 
the closer integration of national economies into the international economy. Susan 
George in “Another World is Possible...”, defines globalisation as “the latest stage of 
capitalism and the political framework that helps it thrive” (2004: 11). For many years 
now, the drivers of globalisation have been urging African policy makers to integrate 
their national economies into the global economy in order to achieve faster economic 
growth. However, the results have not been as expected. According to critics, 
globalisation and restructuring have instead led to growing inequalities, declining 
employment opportunities and high poverty levels. While Stiglitz (2002) argues that 
globalisation can be a force with benefits, he notes that it also has had devastating effects, 
particularly on the poor.  
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Benjamin (1992) observes that a shared characteristic of countries in the Southern 
African region is their level of economic underdevelopment and the structural 
weaknesses of their economies. The inability of countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Angola and even South Africa to move steadily on a path of development and to realise a 
more equal distribution of resources and wealth, argues Benjamin (1992), has contributed 
to internal dissatisfaction and political strife. Clearly, one single most significant 
development that has been a feature of the process of democratisation in Southern Africa 
is the rethinking of economic policies and developmental strategies among some of the 
region’s states. According to Benjamin (1992), the region’s potential for economic 
growth and industrialisation will significantly depend upon the ability of individual states 
to address the structural weaknesses of their economies. 
As countries in the region face overriding economic challenges towards achieving 
equitable and sustainable economic development, they are grappling with the question of 
what kind of economic path is most suitable to deliver economic growth to individual 
countries. Obviously, as argued earlier, the centrally planned model has proved 
unworkable and more countries are turning to the free market economic system. While 
the degree with which free market economic policies are being embraced by individual 
states in the region varies significantly, it is clear that all the states have realised the 
importance and necessity of attracting foreign investment and assistance for the 
envisaged economic reconstruction (Spicer and Reichardt, 1992).  
In order, therefore, for these countries to attract investment, adjustment in various areas is 
inevitable. Spicer and Reichardt suggest that reduced government intervention alongside 
a growing and increasing competitive private sector, liberalising control on trade and 
capital transfers and providing tax incentives for foreign investors “is the model for the 
decade” (1992: 260). However, like many advocates of the free market, Spicer and 
Reichardt (1992) fail to allude to the negative consequences such economic measures 
have on society and the ordinary people. 
One of the immediate challenges confronting all the countries in the Southern African 
region is the need to address the problem of growing unemployment. The pressure of 
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adjustment on national economies in the region has led to a decline in employment levels. 
In short, the labour market has been adversely affected by policies of liberalisation. 
Through trade liberalisation and privatisation, the Sub-Sahara region as a whole, has 
experienced declining employment levels. The continued implementation of economic 
reforms by developing countries has seen a reduction in the role of the state in economic 
development, in favour of the market. Critics also argue that the search for labour market 
flexibility by investors has resulted in the decline of employment and brought about low 
standards in working conditions. Available literature reveals interesting developments 
that have taken place in various regions of the world as part of economic restructuring, 
with post-communist countries dismantling their centrally planned system in preference 
for the market-led economic models (Burawoy, 1999).  
However, it is also interesting and important to note the different approaches used by 
different countries to respond to the challenges of globalisation. For instance, while some 
Eastern European countries like Russia are still grappling with issues of poverty and 
economic decline despite their integration in the global economy, China on the other 
hand, has managed to record increased economic growth and declining levels of poverty 
(Burawoy, 1999). Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular the Southern African region, still 
ranks low in terms of growth in the contemporary world economy. Despite literature 
underplaying geographical and economic differences among countries in Southern 
Africa, major variations exist which have forced countries in the region to respond 
differently to demands of economic restructuring necessitated by the new world 
economic order.  
Data from countries in Southern Africa reveals that existing inequalities and geo-national 
variations have resulted in different responses by countries to globalisation. Countries 
like South Africa and Botswana, with relatively strong economies, have succumbed to 
global dictates of economic restructuring and have started opening up their economies 
whereas others, such as Zambia, underwent rapid liberalisation in an effort to attract 
investment and boost economic growth, in a bid to reverse decline.  
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1.2 Aim of the Study 
The main aim of this study is into examine the social consequences of economic 
liberalisation, in Southern Africa and Zambia in particular. The research focuses on the 
impact of privatisation and other reform measures on employment and working 
conditions of workers and how workers are responding to these changes. The importance 
of this research lies in its contribution to the research agenda on issues of economic 
restructuring and employment in developing countries and what implications such issues 
have for the future policy formulation. The key research question is:  
What are the social consequences of rapid economic restructuring on workers in 
Zambia?  
1.3 Rationale 
It is generally acknowledged that economic restructuring generates both losses and gains 
in its process and it is also widely observed and acknowledged that losses that accrue 
from this process are more visible in developing countries than in the developed 
countries. However, within individual countries, this division is equally apparent. 
Evidence suggests that economic liberalisation has imposed enormous strain on emerging 
economies and the burden of this strain is being borne by the poor in society. The 
negative effects of restructuring are mostly concentrated among a particular group of 
workers while the gains are widely diffused and less visible (Dev, 2000). Through this 
study, it will be shown, by gathering evidence on the impact of liberalisation on the 
structure of employment in emerging economies, that economic reform measures aimed 
at stabilising an economy can in fact produce adverse results on employment growth. It 
will also be shown that these measures equally contribute to the deterioration in the 
quality of employment.  
This research uses Zambia as a case study to show the effects of economic restructuring 
on labour. The example of Zambia, in this sense, is a befitting case given that it is a 
country that faced a double transition by going for a massive liberalisation programme 
which was shortly followed by democratisation. In other words, Zambia is placed on the 
spotlight in this study due to rapid liberalisation the country underwent in an effort to 
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reverse economic decline. From the early 1990s, there have been profound policy 
changes in Zambia’s economic policies which have had a variety of impacts on different 
sections of society.  The economic policy changes have entailed transforming the 
country’s economy from an inward-looking and state-dominated to an outward oriented 
economy largely based on free market policies and promotion of privatization of national 
enterprises. This “shock therapy” has drawn mixed results for different groups or sections 
of the Zambia society 
Just after independence, Zambia made massive public investments in public works and 
creation of parastatal firms which were seen as the engine for development (Turok, 
1989). Through this investment, the state was able to expand employment opportunities. 
As Turok writes, in six years – between 1964 and 1970 – 121 000 jobs were created, with 
manufacturing sector jobs growing by 77 per cent (1989:43). Turok (1989) notes that the 
intervention of the state in the economy was made to advance the interests of Zambian’s 
individually and as a nation. Simwinga (1977) cited by Turok (1989) argues that 
Zambia’s method of state intervention was carefully calculated to cause the least possible 
concern among foreign investors. This state intervention which amounted to a centralised 
command economy was, thus, seen as a legitimate attempt by the state to reduce foreign 
control of the economy.  
Turok suggests that the nature of Zambia’s state intervention was governed by three 
factors. The first factor was a “national response to foreign exploitation at the hands of 
local branches of foreign multinational corporations and expatriate owners generally” 
(1989: 49). Secondly, the local petty bourgeoisie had to use the state to propel themselves 
to a national bourgeoisie and thirdly, the state had to act in order to be seen to be 
fulfilling the promise of independence among the middle class, labour, peasantry and the 
masses in general (Turok, 1989). 
However, the country’s attempt to break some of the power of foreign capital and to 
generate the beginnings of autonomous development, though with some amount of 
success in the early years, set the country on a path of serious economic distortions which 
were to prove costly economically. Although Turok (1989) attributes much of Zambia’s 
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economic decline to world market forces, there are also suggestions pointing to domestic 
malfunctions and distortions which spelt stagnation in the state sector and which 
ultimately brought the whole role of state intervention into question.  
As argued by critics, the current weaknesses in the economy were directly attributed to 
state intervention. Objections to state intervention by capitalist minded Zambians were 
emphatically resisted as there was a strong desire among all classes for national 
development and modernisation. According to Rakner (2003), the state after 
independence, evidently had sufficient capital to set the development agenda in motion. 
But after twenty years of political independence, the country, clearly, began to show 
serious signs of economic deterioration due to a number of factors as shall be shown 
later. Following this decline, the state started to dismantle its command control and began 
to move towards a more liberalised economic system.  
Zambia experimented with various economic models, some of which were largely done 
under the influence of international financing institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The structural adjustment measures that were 
put under implementation caused dissent among Zambians and in some instances resulted 
in violent incidents such as riots. The UNIP government that had been in power since 
independence in 1964 became so unpopular due to the high levels of poverty caused by 
adjustment and this led to its defeat in 1991, following the country’s reversion to plural 
politics.    
The process of economic liberalisation which partially was started by the UNIP 
government in the late 1980s was accelerated by the MMD government in 1991. These 
reforms were seen by many as the only answer to the country’s economic dilemma. The 
political and economic reform processes, as Rakner (2003) shows, initially had strong 
domestic support, including from the outspoken labour movement. The initial period 
following democracy showed a promising economic outlook but as illustrated by 
available literature, the record of policy reforms over the last fifteen years has been both 
complex and characterised by failure at reversing the immiserisation of the majority of 
the people.  
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Given Zambia’s radical approach to restructuring, this study will, therefore, assess the 
effects of restructuring on the labour market and on the lives of the working class in 
Zambia. The concept of ‘social involution’ developed by Michael Burawoy, will be used 
to consider the longer-term social consequences of rapid economic restructuring. Social 
involution is described as the state of going backwards in time. This means instead of a  
transition leading to development, it goes in he opposite direction, leading to failure of 
development and subjecting the middle and lower classes in societies of developing states 
to exploitation by capitalism through the destruction of existing systems of production 
(Burawoy, 2001) 
Although the Zambian case cannot be necessarily be replicated to other countries in the 
region, it could prove useful in providing a framework of understanding how developing 
countries, facing constrained economies, resort to desperate measures as a way of 
addressing structural weaknesses in the economy. Shock treatment is generally justified 
as inflicting pain for future gain. However, as many have argued, the economic logic 
attached to such policies often ignores the longer term social consequences (Burawoy, 
2001; Stiglitz, 2002). This country study on Zambia, therefore, provides a strong basis for 
understanding how economic restructuring, in particular the privatisation of public 
enterprises, impacts on the livelihoods of workers and society leading to inequalities in 
income distribution and precariousness.  
1.4 Chapter Outline 
The report is organised in five chapters. The next chapter presents the literature 
framework for this research. It looks at what sort of policy changes have been adopted by 
economies in transition and in what direction such policies have taken such countries. 
The chapter also discusses globalisation and the neo-liberal agenda in order to provide an 
understanding of what necessitates emerging economies to undertake restructuring. In 
Chapter three, the research looks at the methodology applied in conducting this research. 
The chapter outlines the choice of research methods and describes how data was 
collected. Chapter Four is devoted to the research findings covering case studies of the 
five selected countries in the Southern Africa region. It shows the different experiences of 
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countries in the region by exploring the similarities as well as the differences, in their 
approach to economic liberalisation. In Chapter Five, the research is grounded in Zambia 
by showing how the country’s extreme policy changes have impacted on workers. The 
chapter also provides an analysis on the findings of the study. Chapter Six carries the 
conclusion and recommendations. On the basis of these finding, the chapter makes 
suggestions and recommendations on the way forward on how to minimise the negative 
consequences of economic reforms on workers.   
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Chapter Two   
2.0   The Disembedded Market in Africa: Counter-movement or involution ? 
 
“Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an 
institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and 
natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his 
surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but 
whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganised 
industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which 
forced the development of the market system into a definite groove and finally disrupted 
the social organisation based upon it” (Polanyi, 2001[1944]:3-4) 
 
2.1 Polanyian thinking and the Market 
Modern day economic management thinking dictates that national economies are run 
based on the free market model. Following the dismantling and collapse of the socialist 
system and the ever increasing influence for the integration of national economies into 
the global economy, national economies are increasingly being driven by neo-liberalism 
under the guise of the free market principle. In the above quotation, the great Austrian 
thinker and scholar, Karl Polanyi (1886-1964), describes the market as “an institution 
(that) could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural 
substance of society”.  
 
But what is it that is referred to as the “market”?  Block (2001) draws a linkage between 
the development of the modern state and the development of modern market economies. 
According to Block (2001), while the powerful modern state was necessary to bring 
about changes in the social structure that allowed for a competitive capitalist economy, 
the capitalist economy (commonly known as the free market economy) itself needed a 
strong state to mitigate its harsher effects. Polanyi believed that “English thinkers 
responded to the disruptions of early industrialisation by developing the theory of market 
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liberalism, with its core belief that human society should be subordinated to self-
regulating markets” (Block, 2001: xxii). 
 
In his analysis of economic systems, Polanyi, according to Block (2001), drew out some 
differences between economic structures in which there were markets and the starkly 
utopian self-regulating markets of the nineteenth century. Polanyi sees the “entire 
tradition of modern economic thought, continuing up to the present moment, rests on the 
concept of the economy as an interlocking system of markets that automatically adjusts 
the supply and demand price mechanism” (Block, 2001: xxiii). In Polanyi’s view, 
classical economists had intentions of creating a society in which the economy had been 
disembedded and encouraged politicians to pursue this objective (Block, 2001). But for 
Polanyi, the goal of a disembedded, fully self-regulating market economy is a utopian 
project that cannot exist.  
 
Polanyi argues that before the nineteenth century, the economy was always embedded in 
society, meaning that the economy was not autonomous but subordinated to politics, 
religion and other social relations (Block, 2001). A self-regulating market entails a 
society-wide system of markets in which all inputs into the processes of production and 
distribution were for sale and in which output was distributed solely in exchange for 
earnings from sales of inputs (Mayhew, 2001). Block (2001) argues that it was Polanyi’s 
thinking that the self-regulating markets could not survive because the starkly utopian 
nature of the system initiated a “double-movement”. This refers to the continuing tension 
and conflict between the efforts to establish, maintain, and spread the self-regulating 
market and the efforts to protect people and society from the consequences of the 
working of the self-regulating market. 
The argument here is that as the unrestrained market pushes human society to the edge, 
the people refuse to march to their own destruction and begin to retreat from the tenets of 
market self-regulation to save society from destruction (Block, 2001). In espousing the 
“double movement” framework, Mittelman (1997), explains that the “double movement” 
encapsulates unprecedented market expansion leading to massive social dislocation and a 
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sharp political reaction in the form of demands on the state to counter the effects of the 
market on society. However, what is not clear though is whether, like the global economy 
of the 1930s, the contemporary process of globalisation would similarly, approach a 
conjuncture in which renewed liberal economic structures will generate large scale 
disruptions as well as sustained pressure for self-protection (Mittelman, 1997).  
Early indications, in relation to the current process of globalisation, are that there seems 
to be increasing concerns about the liberal economic structures and the negative effects 
on society, particularly in emerging economies. Societies are demanding a stronger 
presence of the state to protect society without necessarily insulating national economies 
from the world system.  Polanyi also notes that although through the Industrial revolution 
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the economies of much of Western 
Europe had been commercialised where people earned money to buy essential materials, 
control and regulation of markets by government and other organisations were also 
widespread and common and that markets were controlled up until the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (Block, 2001).  
However, Block also argues that Polanyi’s thesis of the double movement contrasts 
sharply with both market liberalism and orthodox Marxism “in the range of possibilities 
that are imagined at any particular moment” (2001: xxix). The drive to bring back the 
state to the forefront is grounded in the fact that markets can only work efficiently and 
dynamically in the presence of the necessary institutional framework. In his discourse of 
market utopianism, Burawoy (2001) insists on the centrality of the state in any market 
economy. I will return to this subject at a later stage in this chapter. 
Another important development towards the end of the eighteenth century and during the 
first half of the nineteenth century that Polanyi brings to the fore, is the development of 
economic liberalism as a body of thought that provided justification of a new set of 
public policies that led to the transformation of land, labour and capital into “fictitious 
commodities” (Block, 2001). In laying out his argument, Polanyi distinguishes between 
“real and fictitious commodities”, arguing that land, labour and money are “fictitious 
commodities because they were not originally produced for sale on a market” (Block, 
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2001: xxv). Polanyi, therefore, raises two issues in relation to the above argument. 
Firstly, on the moral issue, Polanyi argues that it is “wrong to treat nature and human 
beings as objects whose price will be determined entirely by the market”, adding that 
“such a concept violates the principles that have governed societies for centuries where 
nature and human life have always been recognised as having a sacred dimension” 
(Block, 2001: xxv). Secondly, Polanyi argues about the role of the state, emphasising that 
the state must play a role in adjusting the supply of money and credit to avoid inflation 
and deflation, manage shifting demand for employees by providing relief in periods of 
unemployment and maintaining continuity in food production.  Block (2001) argues that 
when state policies move in the direction of disembedding by heavily relying on market 
self-regulation, ordinary people are forced to bear higher costs. 
With the end of the Cold War, Block (2001) thinks Polanyi’s initial optimism about the 
post war era seeing the “unsustainability of market liberalism producing economic crises 
and the re-emergence of authoritarian and aggressive regimes” has been vindicated 
(Block, 2001: xxxvii). Block (2001) thinks that the alternative is that ordinary people in 
nations around the globe are able to engage in a common effort to subordinate the 
economy to democratic politics and rebuild the global economy based on international 
cooperation. Activists in both the developed and developing countries, argues Block 
(2001), are carrying out militant protests against the World Trade Organisation, IMF and 
the World Bank that enforce the rules of neo-liberalism, to try and reconstruct the global 
financial order. According to Block, this transnational movement is an indication of the 
continuing “vitality and practicability of Polanyi’s vision” (2001: xxxvii).  
 
This view is also supported by Stiglitz when he comments in his foreword in Polanyi’s 
“The Great Transformation” that “We have moved, by and large, to a more balanced 
position, one that recognises both the power and limitations of the market, and the 
necessity that governments play a larger role in the economy, though the bounds of that 
role remain in dispute” (2001: viii). Stiglitz also sees Polanyi as one who exposes what he 
(Stiglitz) calls “the weak underbelly of the doctrines of the self-regulating markets” 
(2001: viii). 
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The neo-liberal discourse also draws lessons from Russia’s unprecedented economic 
decline as well as the steps taken by China in applying a cautious approach to 
globalisation which stimulated growth. In every respect, the story of Russia is not only 
grim but attempts to dispel the economic notion that any turn to the market leads to 
improvement. Burawoy (1999) criticizes Karl Polanyi for taking it for granted, when he 
looked at the social consequences of the Russian industrial revolution,  that market 
competition was a foundation for the transformation of production, tremendous increases 
in productivity, the rapid development of new technologies and the elaboration of a new 
mode of production.  
 
So instead of going through a process of transformation and being protected from the 
onslaught, people begin to experience a state of involution where they see themselves as 
retreating from the market (Burawoy, 2001). In the case of  Russia, Burawoy (2001) 
notes that society experienced a “transition without transformation” implying that the 
market transition which was expected to lead to economic, political and social change 
instead drove society into “involutionary degeneration”.  This transition in the opposite 
direction, sadly, leads to failure of development and subjects the middle and lower 
classes in societies of developing states to exploitation by capitalism through the 
destruction of existing systems of production (Burawoy, 2001). This, then, deepens the 
class conflict or order between the elite and those that are marginalized and dispossessed. 
 
Polanyi, cited in Burawoy (1999) argues, it was assumed that society would produce 
classes that will represent the general interest to the state and that the state would 
organize its policies and interventions in accordance with those general interests. 
Polanyi’s logic was that the state would embody the “double movement toward market 
and social protection” (Burawoy, 1999). This logic, however, compels Burawoy to 
question whether society can survive against the market if the state does not represent the 
general interest. With the emergence of a strong market, Burawoy (1999) argues, there 
was a greater possibility of the state being “captured” by short-sighted classes who would 
mercilessly advance their own narrow economic interests and once this occurs the 
executive of the state becomes not the vehicle of social protection but an instrument of 
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market fundamentalism, of a narrow class who own and control the most profitable 
industries, banks and media channels. 
2.2 From Command Economy to Free Market 
According to Burawoy (1999), once the executive begins to align their interests with 
those of the market fundamentalists, the state abrogates its role of protecting labour. The 
state recedes and watches impassively as jobs disappear accompanied by the plummeting 
of wages. While failing to stimulate domestic agricultural production and strengthening 
the manufacturing sector, the state opens the floodgates of cheap foreign food and other 
products, killing local industries as a consequence.   
 
Whereas it was expected that the state in Russia would protect the fictitious commodities 
such as labour, land and money by negotiating a compromise between market and 
society, the self-regulating market was let free to destroy the social order upon which it 
rested. Burawoy (1999) writes of how in the 1990s, Russia, faced with the 
commodification of labour, land and money arrived at a fundamentally different solution 
by taking a headlong retreat from the market to more primitive economic forms. Without 
paid jobs, workers were denied benefits from the state and while the workplace continued 
to act as an informal welfare order, working class families looked to outside work to 
produce the means of their livelihood (Burawoy, 1999).     
 
The process of transition in Russia meant the end of guaranteed employment, as 
unprofitable enterprises had to close down and others could no longer maintain their 
bloated labour force (Marnie, 1992). African countries that have decided to transit from 
command economies to market-type have taken a similar route with millions of workers 
losing their jobs. The only contrast, however, is that while African countries closed state 
enterprises without planning for the future of the affected workers, Russia considered the 
inclusion of a new Employment Act in its economic reform, to set out a provision for the 
anticipated large increases in unemployment (Marnie, 1992). Whether these provisions 
were effective is a subject for further research although Marnie (1992) argues that there is 
no evidence of large scale labour re-allocation in Russia apart from an increase in the 
discussion of unemployment. However, as has been argued elsewhere, Marnie (1992) 
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explains that the transition from communism to markets in Russia was meant to 
encourage the rational use of resources including labour.  
Although much of the available literature on global transitions focuses on Eastern 
Europe, there is growing interest among various interest groups towards assessing and 
evaluating the impact of globalisation on African economies.  Africa has been on the 
receiving end in terms of the negative impacts of globalisation. As Mutethia (2000) 
observes, no region has suffered during this period of globalisation as Africa. In most 
cases, African countries are under severe pressure to borrow heavily in order to settle 
outstanding debts to developed countries. This leaves them with insufficient capital to 
implement development projects within their countries. Cheru (2001) espouses this view 
by emphasizing that, from the slave trade in 1650 and continuing under the colonial rule 
after the Berlin Conference of 1884, the continent had been heavily drawn into the 
centres of capital accumulation, but always as a subordinate partner whose primary role 
was to contribute to the development of the metropolitan powers.  
 
Of particular usefulness to this subject is the work of Mamdani (1996) who, in his 
discourse on colonialism in Africa shows how colonial authorities wanted to extract 
material and labour resources through passing laws on tax collection and forced labour. 
Mamdani (1996) argues that while European and American capitalists fought 
communism at the ideological level, colonial rule kept the peasants in Africa under an 
economy that was forced and only partly free. This tendency by the imperialists to 
control the destiny of less developed economies such as those of the African continent is 
crystallized in the insistence by the developed nations, on developing countries to 
urgently integrate in the global economy in order to derive benefits while at the same 
time ensuring that such countries participate on unequal terms. The legacy of colonialism, 
thus, seems to live on,   grounded in the presumption that the developed North is bringing 
civilization and modernity they (Africans) are in great need of. This presumption that 
Africa can only develop by copying economic models of the developed countries is a 
fallacy, far fetched and reminiscent of colonial thinking.  
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However, critics can only see this sort of rhetoric as one that is merely calculated at self-
serving the interests of the former colonisers. Mamdani’s (1996) account of the “direct” 
and “indirect” rule, through which colonial rulers asserted their authority on Africans, 
clearly tells how local institutions can effectively be used to fragment resistance. Through 
“decentralized despotism”, the colonial authorities were able to exercise their control 
over Africa while deflecting opposition by appointing native authorities.  
 
Similarly, it can be argued that global capital is using state institutions to impose itself on 
African economies and perpetuate the extraction of material resources and profits from 
investment.  Further more, by using state institutions, global capital is able to fragment 
resistance from citizens, particularly labour which feels dispossessed by the imposition of 
economic reforms and creation of exploitative business empires. In other words, global 
capital is using the state to create a safe haven for investment at the expense of the 
welfare of the local people. Mamdani’s works on colonialism in Africa, therefore, 
presents a basis for understanding how capitalism, just like colonialism can be harmful if 
the Africans do not sufficiently challenge it. 
 
Indeed even before the dawn of the globalisation era, Africa was subjected to an unfair 
trade relationship with the developed world and the continent still faces major barriers in 
terms of trade. This means the options open to Africa continue to narrow as the world 
dictates on the choice of participation in global integration through various conditions. 
Despite the promises of high standards of living that the process is said to offer, Africa’s 
case has been that of marginalisation and stagnation (Mutethia, 2000). In other words, 
just like the 19th century globalisation under colonialism, the current stage of 
globalisation could yet lead to further marginalization of the African countries. For Cheru 
(2001), African countries can only survive the globalisation onslaught if they summon 
sufficient muscle among themselves and build coherent strategies which can enable them 
navigate successfully through this complex process.  
Block (2001) points out that Polanyi’s arguments remain important and relevant in 
contemporary debates on globalisation, given that neo-liberals continue to embrace the 
same utopian vision and have insisted that the integration of the global economy is 
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making national boundaries obsolete and is laying the basis for a new era of global peace. 
But the one fundamental point Block (2001) raises, based on Polanyi’s writing, is the 
failure by neo-liberals to recognise and appreciate that market liberalism makes demands 
on ordinary people that are simply not sustainable. Block (2001) adds flesh to this 
argument when he points to widespread protests occurring around the world where 
people are resisting the economic disruptions of globalisation. He also writes of the 
devastating effects of the structural adjustment programmes in many parts of Africa, 
which have led to the disintegration of societies, famine and civil wars (Block: 2001). 
Block, thus, concludes “this is how the utopian vision of neo-liberals leads not to peace 
but to intensified conflict” (2001: xxxv).  
However, an impression should not be created that the capitalist world operates like a 
well oiled machine. Dixon and Heffernan argue that the capitalist system operates in 
many contradictory ways “to provide an endless supply of dilemmas confronting 
individuals and institutions” (1991: 17). It, therefore, follows that for social change to 
take place there must be contestations against the capitalist system. Based on this 
assumption, Ake (1981) argues that by contrasting the structures of African economies in 
their colonial and post colonial phases, there emerges an implicit postulation that the 
achievement of political independence was an essential change that would have a major 
impact on the future development of Africa. The nationalist petit-bourgeoisie which 
fought for independence in African states felt that political independence was key to 
fundamental restructuring of the colonial economy and many agree that “the political 
hegemony of the colonisers was a critical factor in the underdevelopment of African 
social formations” (Ake, 1981: 88). However, decades after gaining political 
independence, African states have clearly failed to register significant and revolutionary 
changes to their economies. Is Africa capable of launching a second liberation movement, 
of a new form, to unshackle itself from the economic enslavement imposed by the 
industrialised North? This question, obviously, can draw both pessimistic and optimistic 
responses. 
Therefore, having looked at development of economic systems in Europe and Africa 
from the eighteenth century up until now, one sees some analogies between the 
  18
 
 
developments that occurred during the great transformation of European civilisation and 
the transformation confronting developing countries around the world today. The 
developments can be summarised as shown in the table below.  
Table 1: Stages of transformation 
 First Great 
Transformation 
Counter Movement Second Great 
Transformation 
North 
-First Wave of 
industrialisation 
-Market despotism 
-Welfare state 
-Hegemonic regime 
-Hollowing out of 
welfare state 
-Concession bargaining 
in the workplace based 
on collective 
bargaining 
South -Colonial despotism 
(Decentralised 
despotism) 
 
-National liberation -Structural adjustment programmes 
 
2.3     Globalisation and the Neo-liberal Agenda 
Globalisation and neo-liberalism are often confused to mean one thing even though the 
two carry different meanings. There seems to be a very thin line dividing these two 
concepts. However, it is globalisation that is widely seen to have brought about wider 
economic changes in the world. As George (2004) writes, globalisation is seen as a force 
that unites the countries of the world. Thus writes George, “The word globalisation 
sounds as though it means an economic system integrating all countries, all classes and 
all peoples into one harmonious whole – a kind of collective march, hand in hand, 
towards the Promised Land”.  However, the process of globalisation is largely seen as 
having brought about the inequality among the various regions of the world, between the 
poor and the rich, between the North and South. Globalisation has meant inclusion, in the 
world economy, of different countries on unequal terms (George, 2004). 
In general terms, the process of globalisation has affected the continent of Africa and 
African countries in several ways, including economically, politically and socially. The 
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effects of globalisation on the continent have manifested themselves in different forms, 
both positively and negatively. There are those who argue that globalisation has posed 
more threats on the continent than benefits. The most significant aspects of globalisation 
have included removal of trade barriers through opening up of national borders, increased 
economic integration, increased financial flows and rapid technological change. 
However, globalisation remains a highly controversial subject arising from the diversity 
of its effects. Webster and Bezuidenhout (2003) aptly describe the advantages of 
globalisation as being “too distant for too many”, while its risks are all too real. 
Admittedly, global restructuring is delivering modernity to some, while for the majority, 
the benefits of cross-border flows of capital, knowledge, information and consumer 
goods remain a dream. 
Interesting developments have taken place in various regions of the world as part of 
globalisation, with post-communist countries dismantling their centrally planned system 
in preference for the market-led economic models (Burawoy, 1999). However, it is 
equally interesting and important to note the different approaches used by different 
countries to respond to challenges of globalisation. Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular the 
Southern African region, still ranks low in terms of growth in the contemporary world 
economy. Despite literature underplaying geographical and economic differences among 
countries in Southern Africa, major variations exist which have forced countries in the 
region to respond differently to demands of economic restructuring necessitated by the 
new world economic order. The question, therefore, is how are these countries adjusting 
to the new world order? 
For Africa what holds true, though, is that there has been a clear and visible break with 
the certainties and expectations of modernization. Indications in some of the countries in 
the Southern African sub-region point to a situation where there has been increased 
‘rolling back’ of the state, the abandonment of the goal of industrialization, the religious 
commitment to the market policy and privatization and above all the shattered 
expectations of modernization (Ferguson, 1999). As Burawoy (1999) notes, the world is 
today witnessing the unstoppable destruction capitalism is wrecking on post-colonial 
societies, where such societies face the reverse problem. This is the problem of the 
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withdrawal of the markets from the periphery. Burawoy argues that “so effective was 
colonialism in incorporating the market that the battle now is to attract investment into 
the former colonies at any cost rather than defending against market invasion” (1999:19). 
Countries like South Africa and Botswana in the Southern African region, with relatively 
strong economies, have succumbed to global dictates of economic restructuring and have 
started opening up their economies whereas others such as Zambia underwent rapid 
liberalisation in an effort to attract investment and boost economic growth. The opening 
up of national economies to international competition has had profound and contradictory 
effects on individual countries. However, as many have argued (Burawoy, 2001, Stiglitz, 
2002), the economic logic attached to such policies often ignore the longer term social 
consequences.  
It is perhaps from the negative impact of globalisation that some scholars see the process 
as a continuation of colonialism under a different coat. Ferguson (1999) argues that when 
the juncture between Africa and the industrialized world that had been presented as a 
global stairway leading from the developing world to the developed, revealed itself 
instead as a wall separating the two, it was the Copperbelt (a copper producing province 
in Zambia) and other similar places - proud examples of just how modern, urban and 
prosperous an emerging Africa could be - that experienced this boundary fixing process 
most acutely, as a kind of abjection.   
 
The experience of abjection Ferguson (1999) talks about here is not a matter of merely 
being excluded from a status to which one had never had claim but of being relegated, 
expelled or cast-out by what one would term the creation of a new boundary. As 
Ferguson (1999) asserts, when the workers on the Copperbelt expressed their sense of 
abjection from an imagined modern world “out there”, they were not merely lamenting a 
lack of “connection” but articulating a specific experience of “disconnection”. As 
Webster and Mosoetsa put it, “…disconnection is a relationship in which one side hangs 
up on the other, without necessarily cutting the links” (2001:33). This, according to Owen 
Sichone (2000) in Webster and Mosoetsa (2001), has cast the African region back to the 
“second class status” from which independence had left it. 
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Thus, when one thinks of Zambia today as being disconnected and excluded in so many 
ways from the global economy, one sees disconnection as a relation and not the absence 
of a relation (Ferguson, 1999). Based on this thinking, Dependency theorists, as 
suggested by Ferguson, usefully distinguish between the state of being undeveloped (an 
original condition) and a state of being underdeveloped (the historical result of an active 
process of underdevelopment). Therefore, what can be useful from the Zambian case is 
that globalisation shows us just how important the concept of disconnection is to a “new 
world order” that presents itself as a situation of effective connection. Cooper (2001) also 
suggests that the globalisation fad is an important development for understanding the 
interconnectedness of different parts of the world and for explaining the mechanisms 
shaping the movement of capital, people and culture. If we were to agree that 
globalisation should be seen as a perpetuation of colonialism, then Cooper (2001) is right 
to suggest that what is missing in the current discussions of globalisation, is the historical 
depth of interconnections and a focus on just what the structures and limits of connecting 
mechanisms are.  
 
Cooper’s view is that the concept of globalisation should be discussed in the context of it 
being “a large scale, but not universal, and with the fact of crucial linkages that cut across 
state borders and line of cultural difference but which nonetheless are based on specific 
mechanisms within certain boundaries” (Cooper, 2001: 192). Cooper argues that the 
common conceptions of globalisation are problematic because they thrive on what he 
terms “totalizing pretensions and their presentist periodisation” (2001: 193).   
 
Therefore, with all the hype about globalisation today, with the new forms of worldwide 
interconnection and, interestingly, another emerging new world society, it would be 
useful to consider where Africa fits in all of this. What would the case of Zambia, as 
presented by Ferguson (1999), of decline and abjection tell about the nature of this new 
world order? For Ferguson, his account on Zambia illustrates the down side of global 
capitalism and equally reveals something more fundamental about the mechanisms of 
“membership, exclusion and abjection upon which the contemporary system of 
spatialized global inequality depends” (1999:236). I argue that while globalisation thrives 
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on the principle of inclusion, the process has remained tragically limited in terms of 
distribution of benefits. While some scholars advance the view that the process has 
brought about widespread prosperity, there is sufficient evidence suggesting that the rich 
countries have kept their doors closed to exports of underdeveloped nations (Wolf, 2004). 
As a result, Africa and other developing regions of the world remain reluctant 
participants to the process. 
 
As noted by Osei-Hwedie (2003), liberal economic policies in Zambia did not spur 
economic recovery, sustainable development or poverty reduction. Analysts present the 
view that the country witnessed unprecedented levels of poverty and misery following 
economic liberalization. Despite the privatization of the mining industry, for instance, 
production and world copper prices declined and have worsened in the 1990s (Osei-
Hwedie, 2003), although in recent years prices have stabilized and in fact assumed an 
upward trend.  According to Osei-Hwedie (2003), privatization of public companies was 
deliberately mismanaged to allow the leadership in the ruling party to buy the privatized 
companies cheaply. Questions have also been raised over the handling of funds realized 
from privatization. The poor handling of the economy in the early 1990s has been 
attributed to a lack of vision by the ruling party which seems to have been more 
interested in ousting the government of Kaunda and the unconditional acceptance of the 
World Bank/IMF economic policy prescription on Zambia (Osei-Hwedie, 2003). 
Zimbabwe also presents a clearest example of a country that has experienced the process 
of disconnection and where vulnerable groups have had to develop various coping 
strategies in order to survive (Webster and Mosoetsa, 2001). The people of Zimbabwe 
have not only experienced the negative effects of liberalisation but have undergone 
involution as the country’s economy continues to plummet. The food riots that swept 
through the country in the year 2000 are a clear testimony of the level of discontent 
among nationals of the government’s social policies which have led to cutbacks in 
spending on social services and subsidies. This means that people have been thrown back 
onto their own resources for survival. Webster and Mosoetsa (2001) argue that the lack of 
access by citizens to basic social services makes a “mockery” of the idea of citizenship 
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where citizens lose their right to income security, education, health and other forms of 
welfare. 
However, despite its inherent advantages and disadvantages, globalisation still remains a 
crucial process in understanding the fundamental political, social and economic 
transformations that have taken place at global level. The worldwide demand for 
democracy, the re-organization of production, the relocation and distribution of industries 
and consumables across borders and the massive migration of people between countries 
is a manifestation of globalisation. As Stiglitz writes, “Polanyi saw the market as part of 
the broader economy, and the broader economy as part of a still broader society” and 
further more, “Polanyi saw the market economy not as an end itself, but as means to more 
fundamental ends” (2001: xv). Stiglitz (2001) argues that privatisation, liberalisation and 
even macro-stabilisation have been treated as objectives of reform, notwithstanding how 
these have affected the lives of individuals in terms of pushing them into poverty, loss of 
employment and feeling of powerlessness. 
2.4 The Neo-liberal Agenda 
The neo-liberal agenda, on the other hand, is an economic doctrine based on open 
competitive markets where price regimes are to be determined by forces of supply and 
demand. This doctrine has been promoted in the last twenty years or so and is largely 
seen as an alternative development framework which can be used to address global high 
levels of poverty (Williamson, 2004). According to Williamson (2004), the neo-liberal 
agenda, generally referred to by many scholars as the “Washington Consensus” is a list of 
policies that he (Williamson) claimed were widely held in Washington to be desirable for 
development in Latin America during the late 1980s. Further Williamson (2004) asserts 
that the set of economic policies advocated for developing countries  in general official 
Washington-based international financial institutions better known as (the IFIs) 
encompassing the World Bank and the IMF,  laid heavy emphasis on institutional reforms 
and some recognition of the social dimension.  The IFIs are therefore, generally viewed 
by critics as agents of the “neo-liberalism” which seek to reduce the role of the state 
(Williamson, 2004). 
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Although Williamson (2004) argues that the bulk of the economic evaluations of 
privatization, which is a strong component of the neo-liberalism agenda, conclude that it 
has succeeded in two dimensions: in raising efficiency and profitability of the privatized 
enterprises, and in increasing coverage and access to privatized utilities, studies have 
shown that privatisation has also led to social deprivation, inequality and loss of jobs 
(Stiglitz, 2002, Burawoy, 2001, Webster and Bezuidenethout, 2003). This view is, 
however, also espoused by Williamson who argues that - at least in Latin America, where 
“Latinobarometro” provides regular and reliable evidence of public attitudes - 
privatization is intensely and increasingly unpopular (2004:2). In most instances, due to 
high levels of corruption in many cases, privatisation of state enterprises in liberalising 
economies in Africa was used as a process of acquiring assets cheaply by the elite in 
society, particularly politicians, managers of the privatised enterprises and technocrats 
involved in the privatisation process.  
 
Available evidence suggests that privatisation of national enterprises did prove to be a 
more complex affair than had been expected. Countries such as Zambia went into 
privatisation without first creating strong institutions to oversee the process. This 
rendered the whole programme prone to corruption. Even those enterprises which were 
off-loaded were found to have been under priced in most cases. This illicit means of 
acquiring public property attracted public hostility towards privatisation. With the 
apparent loss of jobs that often accompanies privatisation, it can be safely be concluded 
that privatisation of state utilities hurts mainly the middle and lower classes. I would, 
therefore, agree with Williamson (2004) when he argues that as opposed to rapid 
privatisation, it is more important to do it right if the intentions are to be achieved. 
Arguably, transition should be a gradual process, consisting of a combination of policies 
of liberalization and stabilization as well as institution building. It should also be realised 
that such processes take time and are costly, both in financial and social terms. 
Further more, rapid privatisation came to be known in the eyes of many workers as a 
process that lowered living standards and eroded the worker’s social values as evidenced 
by its effects on social programs. Upon privatisation, some workers are left without any 
severance packages resulting in a state of disillusionment among workers. This then 
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suggests that privatisation is often implemented without giving priority to the social and 
economic effects on the workers. George (2004) describes privatisation as a “polite 
word” for alienation or giveaways, given that the state enterprise that is privatised is the 
valuable product of years of hard work by thousands of employees. I argue, therefore, 
that while privatisation was meant to spur competition and improve production, the 
importance of social and organisation capital (good institutions) was overlooked and 
resulted in the process being politically unpopular among many people, particularly those 
who are negatively affected by the consequences.   
 
It is generally held, therefore, that the many social and economic problems Africa is 
facing today have been largely blamed on the effects of globalisation. However, as Cheru 
(2001) argues, Africa may not have been adequately prepared to adjust herself to these 
global changes and to exploit the new opportunities and tackle the challenges presented 
by the globalisation. This view is espoused by the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC), which argues that experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa point to the 
inadequacy of existing policy prescriptions to respond sufficiently and effectively to the 
challenges of poverty and economic development within a globalizing world (SADC 
Report, 2000). As Cheru observes, the present globalisation, much like the 19th century 
globalisation under colonialism, could leave the continent permanently scared unless the 
African leaders and their people are mobilised to manage it successfully to their own 
advantage (2001). But how can the African people mobilize themselves amid such grave 
divisions between the rich and the poor? Obviously, the imbalances inherent in the 
process of globalisation make it practically impossible for the world to derive uniform 
benefits from the system. Globalisation can, thus, be seen as a process that seeks to 
justify and legitimize the neo-liberal agenda, create a global free market and the 
consolidate western capitalism within the world’s major economic blocks (George, 2004)  
 
2.5 The Washington Consensus versus the Decent Work Agenda 
The desire by states to pursue the neo-liberal agenda as a basis for ensuring the efficient 
allocation of resources and stimulate economic growth has resulted in what (Aguiar and 
Herod, 2006) call the exteriorization of economic relationships, which were previously 
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internal to the structure of companies. The state, through the adoption of market 
deregulation policies, which are central to the Washington Consensus, has undermined 
the protection of workers and lowered labour standards. The workers feel abandoned by 
the state as they see flexibility as an affront on the protection of their rights and freedom. 
However, to speak of abandonment here does not entail being outside of the world 
capitalist system. As Ferguson argues, “expulsion, abandonment and disconnection occur 
within capitalism and not outside of it”(1999: 242). Ferguson shows that global 
capitalism creates social and geographical membership and privilege through maintaining 
a rule of “absolute non-membership” where a holding tank is maintained for those 
stopped at the development door or those to be found in a global “second class” (1999: 
242).  
 
However, as argued earlier, the fundamental point is that globalisation is not simply a 
process that links the world into one but one which also differentiates the world by way 
of creating inequalities alongside building commonalities and communication. In this 
sense, Africa can be categorized under abjection in the new global dispensation, where 
development has failed to deliver the promised economic growth and social cultural 
modernization. Workers have been deprived of their “industrial citizenship rights” 
through the restructuring of the state regulation covering the workplace and in the false 
belief that employers will be forced by the market to protect their workers (Aguiar and 
Herod, 2006). The problem I find here is that countries in the developing world have 
‘deregulated’ based on the prescription from the Washington Consensus and not on the 
individual needs of each country. This point is supported by Stiglitz (2002) who argues 
that the current problem is that global institutions reflect the mind-sets of those to whom 
they are accountable. The process has not been implemented in tandem with the needs of 
individual countries and has more often than not been rushed in terms of implementation, 
using wrong and inadequate policies or analysis. The criticism Stiglitz (2002) raises 
exposes the game of politics in the institutions of Washington Consensus (IMF, World 
Bank and WTO) which has resulted into failure by the institutions to deliver positive 
results. 
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Wolf (2004) attempts to justify the necessity of the market model and speaks of the need 
for good politics as a pre-requisite to efficient resource allocation and management. Wolf 
thinks markets thrive in countries where policies are implemented in a manner that is 
credible, predictable, transparent and consistent. However, one wonders what is good 
about the politics of the Washington Consensus if rich and powerful countries negotiate 
terms with poor and weak states on uneven terrain and under circumstances which end up 
exposing developing countries to open themselves up with insufficient safety nets. It is 
this imbalance in negotiations that has forced most such countries into excessive poverty, 
misery and set the clock of development in reverse. This also affirms assertions that 
markets in developing countries opened too fast or rapidly for competition before strong 
financial institutions were established while jobs were destroyed faster than the new ones 
were created. This gave rise to increases in unemployment and poverty. A growing 
number of people who once held permanent jobs are increasingly joining the informal 
sector in a struggle to survive. As Ferguson(1999) argues, this has led to a process of 
‘disconnection’.  
 
Although Wolf (2004) suggests that globalisation has not worked in most developing 
countries because they have not sufficiently opened up their economies, he does not seem 
to allude to the existing global inequalities that hinder the full participation of these 
countries. In fact certain evidence shows that despite considerable opening up of their 
economies, most developing countries have been by-passed by globalisation. It is 
difficult, therefore, to specifically attribute the failure by developing countries to fully 
integrate into the global economy to inadequate commitment to liberalization. It is 
necessary to consider the weak domestic conditions of infrastructure, skills and 
institutions and lack of access to markets.  
 
In the absence of strong regulatory framework on labour markets in developing countries, 
as Webster and Bezuidenhout (2003) suggest, destructive economic fluctuations have 
characterized the labour market resulting in a reduction in labour standards. Given that 
governments tend to dismantle regulations upon investors’ demands for flexibility, labour 
is left vulnerable to the dictates of the powerful multinationals and this has resulted in the 
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removal of the protection previously enjoyed. There has also been an assault on workers 
collectivism, created by rapid changes in labour legislation and the decline in the ability 
of unions to organize. Unions have suffered fragmentation and subsequent loss of 
membership and strength following unilateral changes in labour laws under the guise of 
allowing workers to exercise their right to freedom of choice.  
 
Controversy also surrounds the on-going debate on why developing countries seem to 
accord foreign investors huge tax concessions as a way of rendering the country more 
attractive to foreign investment. This is in addition to promised labour flexibility which 
entails relaxing norms on workers dismissal, health and safety conditions, social security 
contributions, unionization and collective bargaining. Other countries will go further and 
classify certain parts of the country as Export Processing Zones (EPZs) which are 
characterized by deplorable working conditions and low wages. And as tax changes are 
effected in developing countries, it is widely noted that the effect of these changes tend to 
shift away from the wealthy towards the middle and lower classes.  
 
In contrast to what Burawoy (2001) refers to as the ‘administered economy’, which had a 
strong presence of the state and enhanced worker control over production, the new order 
has put profits before the welfare of workers. The state has been relegated to a near-
spectator the plight of the workers. When workers no longer feel protected by the state, 
they feel dehumanized and because of the increased threat of dismissals, the level of 
militancy and unionization among the workers declines. Since, as Burawoy (2001) 
argues, the state is incapable of defending society and workers against the ‘invading’ 
market, it watches hopelessly as jobs disappear and real wages decline while those who 
have worked all their lives cannot be paid their pension. Also of concern is the emergence 
of different forms of employment such as casualisation, sub-contracting, temporary 
employment and the growth of the informal sector. 
 
The result of transformation and dismantling of state regulations in transitional 
economies has been the subjection of workers to immiseration and exposure to abuse by 
employers. Stating the argument more explicitly, Gill (1997) argues that attempts to 
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destroy and weaken independent labour unions, which are the only institutions left to 
protect workers, and to push for minimum wages tend to be more appealing to industries 
threatened by cheap imports through liberalized trade. This leads to a pervasive sense of 
the social and economic insecurity, widespread among middle and lower classes. 
According to the International Labour Organisation, it is currently believed that the rights 
of capital are better protected than the rights of workers (ILO Report: 2004). For the ILO, 
fair rules for trade, capital and greater access to markets are needed to provide more 
space for developing countries. Further, the ILO suggests that there should exist basic 
social protection, respect for core labour standards and adequate adjustment assistance for 
workers in all countries to provide more security to individuals, families and 
communities.   
 
Competition between locally produced goods against cheaper imported products has also 
had a profound effect on employment levels. The removal of protection of local 
industries by states in developing countries has opened up such industries to stiff 
competition from usually subsidized imported goods from the developed nations. There 
exists a stark picture of thousands of workers in Africa who are losing jobs due to closure 
of firms that cannot put up with competition with imported cheaper goods. As local 
companies struggle to survive, there is a frantic ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of wages 
and working conditions. For instance the proliferation of cheap sweat shop imports has 
had a crippling effect on the textile industries in the Southern African region. 
 
2.6 Liberalisation and the Role of the State 
Although advocates of the neo-liberal agenda speak so romantically about policies of 
privatization, deregulation, free trade and the minimalist role of the state, they 
conveniently avoid discussing how globalisation has also led to the withering of state 
sovereignty in developing countries. Before the on-set of globalisation and liberalization, 
the state was seen as a protector of the domestic economy against external forces.  
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As George explains, “contemporary social life is associated with the modern state, which 
specifies the proper form of nearly all types of human activity. The state appears to be the 
omnipresent, regulating the conditions of life from birth registration to death certification. 
From the policing of every  day activities to the provision of education and promotion of 
health care, the steady expansion of state power appears beyond question” (2004: 9).   
However, this state autonomy faces a severe threat and has substantially reduced 
following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the socialist regimes 
(Mittelman, 1997).  
 
In analyzing the theory of the state as a way of understanding the role the state is playing 
in the construction of a global capitalism, Mittelman (1997) asserts that the world is 
today witnessing how global capitalism has escaped the state and is now operating 
beyond the state’s control. Held in (Mittelman, 1997) perhaps provides a distinct 
explanation of globalisation when he sums up the process as a new order involving the 
emergence of global economic system which, among other developments, stretches 
beyond the control of the state, including the dominant states. Held argues that there has 
been an expansion of networks of transitional linkages and communications over which 
particular states have little influence. 
 
With the re-definition of the role of the state under the Washington Consensus, the state 
is now largely seen as a transmission belt between national and international interests and 
in most cases this transmission is lopsided with the national being on the receiving end. 
Supporting this point, George (2004) argues that economic globalisation is leading to the 
“denationalisation” of economies through the establishment of trans-national networks of 
production, trade and finance. This means that with the removal of barriers, national 
governments have merely assumed the role of being agents of global market forces and 
the decline in state authority is clearly evident in the states’ failure to protect citizens 
from the invisible hand of market forces. Decisions on labour matters which were 
previously managed through established state structures, such as tripartite structures, are 
now the preserve of the state. Such structures have been relegated to being mere talking 
shops.  
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2.7 Inequality and Social Involution 
As shown earlier, since the 1980s, the Southern African region has seen increasing 
poverty levels and growing inequalities. Although it is problematic to link the falling 
standard of living directly to the process of globalisation, there is evidence showing that 
the world poor have become poorer in the last 25 years or so, the same period the new era 
of globalisation has been so pronounced. Cheru (2001) argues that over recent decades, 
growth of per capita income in low income countries has contributed to changes in world 
inequality and poverty and suggests, therefore, that the most important effects of 
globalisation could be on the economic growth rates of those countries.   
 
Critics of globalisation, however, see it as a process that has impacted negatively on 
many third world economies in many aspects.  Henriot (1998) writes that while 
globalisation has increased opportunities for economic growth in developed countries, 
developing countries particularly Africa have witnessed growing disparities and 
inequalities in economic and social areas. The severe economic reforms that have 
constrained economic growth in most African countries and other developing parts of the 
world, says Henriot (1998), can largely be blamed on globalisation. The implementation 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by most African countries has led to sky-
rocketing prices of basic needs, goods and services and to massive retrenchments of 
formal employment labour force.  
 
As argued elsewhere, there are huge social costs to unemployment such as anxiety among 
workers who have managed to keep their jobs, additional financial burden on family 
members who manage to remain employed and the withdrawal of children from school to 
support the family. Stiglitz (2002) explains that these kinds of social consequences of 
unemployment endure long past the immediate loss of a job. More often, the practice of 
dismissing workers seems common when a firm is sold to foreign investors whose greater 
obligation is to the shareholders who would want to maximize stock market value by 
reducing costs. Domestic firms, on the other hand, being attuned to the social context 
may be reluctant to fire workers if they know there are no alternative jobs available.  
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Perhaps a unique feature of the current process of globalisation, as Khor (2001) notes, is 
the globalisation of policy-making mechanisms. Policies on economic, social, cultural 
and technical issues which previously were a preserve of nation states have increasingly 
come under the influence of international agencies and processes of big business and 
economic players. This has technically meant the erosion of state sovereignty and skewed 
the ability of governments and citizens to make choices from options in economic, social 
and cultural policies. According to Khor (2001), the inability of the developing countries 
to maintain their national policy making capacity can largely be attributed to the 
increased levels of economic liberalization and developments in technology. This 
includes the free flow of international capital and the control and influence exerted by 
trans-nationals and financial institutions on resources.  
 
2.8 Benefits of Globalisation 
However, without having to sound very negative of globalisation as an integrating 
process, it is important to highlight the positive side of the system. Proponents of 
globalisation will argue that the greatest challenge facing the global economy today is the 
fight against poverty. As far as economic analysts are concerned, global poverty can be 
effectively fought through a sustained system of economic growth. Arguably, economic 
growth can flourish in an environment where good policies are in place and this can only 
be ensured through a consisted policy framework which is firmly integrated in the global 
economic system. Developing nations can, therefore, benefit from this integration 
through capital flows from developed countries. Fischer (2003) argues that in terms of 
their daily lives, people in developing countries today are more likely than 50 years ago 
to “consume the products of another country, to invest in another country, to earn income 
from other countries, to talk on the telephone to people in other countries, to visit other 
countries, to know that they are being affected by economic development in other 
countries and to know of other development in other countries”.  Therefore it is held that 
increased global economic integration promotes competition, thereby affording the 
benefit of choice to consumers.   
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Those who argue for globalisation, hold that through the removal of barriers of all kinds, 
globalisation helps in the transfer, through free flow of knowledge, capital, services and 
goods across borders. Proponents see the process as one that is capable of increasing 
wealth for countries of the world through the sharing of knowledge, technology and best 
practices across geographical boundaries. This attempt to reduce world poverty can be 
seen in the light of technology helping to bring people more into the mainstream of the 
economy and as a result help companies expand and grow their markets. In fact, it is 
argued that developing countries could benefit more from the process as they are able to 
use advanced technology to develop their industries and ultimately their economies.  
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
Given that this study was aimed at understanding the longer-term social consequences of 
economic restructuring, the research question could only be adequately answered using a 
combination of research methods. The research for this study was conducted between 
2005 and 2006.  
 
In order to understand the diversity of approaches to economic restructuring, it was 
decided to conduct country case studies of Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Botswana. Because of Zambia’s particular approach - that of “shock treatment” 
liberalisation – it was decided to do a more in-depth study of this country. Throughout, a 
key concern is the impact of restructuring on the commoditisation of labour – hence the 
focus on labour markets and unemployment. For the overview of the five countries, the 
study draws on a combination of interviews and available data. For the case of Zambia, 
the study draws on a range of interviews with policy actors and experts, as well as 
available data. In order to assess the longer-term social consequences of restructuring 
through an in-depth study  of a privatised water utility, interviews were conducted with 
managers, trade union officials and workers who had worked in the utility when it was 
still publicly owned and who are now in the privatised entity.  
  
Given the diversity and nature of data required, the research required a systematic 
approach, using different methods of data collection. However, it was found necessary to 
use a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods, although it was the latter 
was considered more important for this study. The method of using different strategies to 
collect and compare data is called triangulation by some researchers. Qualitative research 
attempts to study human action from the insider’s perspective and the goal is defined as 
describing and understanding rather than explaining and predicting human behaviour 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998).  
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It has been shown by social scientists such as Franklin Giddings (1855-1931) and Samuel 
Stouffer (1900–1960) who were considered champions of the quantitative paradigm at 
Columbia University in 1930s and 1940s, that there was a close link between 
quantification and use of statistics and they both advocated a strong rational for statistics 
(Babbie and Mouton, 1998).  
 
The qualitative paradigm on the other hand, is where research takes its departure point 
(Babbie, et al 1998: 53) as “the insider perspective on social action”. This means 
qualitative studies will always attempt to study human action from the insiders’ 
perspective, the goal of which is to describe and understand rather than explain and 
predict human behaviour.  It is true, however, that quantitative techniques can draw on 
some of the “stock-in-trade” of what is normally referred to as qualitative methods and 
the opposite is also true (Payne and Payne, 2004: 184). However, practically, Hall et al. 
(1996) point to difficulties by researchers in gaining access to situations and to other 
sources of data in the kinds of areas where they may have interest.  
 
It was evident from the very outset that in order for this research to secure the required 
data and information on impacts, the research required to sample the different levels of 
personal experiences, aspirations and responses which are suited to a qualitative 
approach. It is also clear that issues that may trouble labour (workers) or employers may 
not necessarily trouble policy makers. For instance through a quantitative method 
(survey), a study can provide data on whether workers have been able to change jobs as a 
response to restructuring but in-depth interviews can explore how this change affects 
workers and their families. 
 
An essential characteristic of scientific research, writes Barker (1994), is that it is 
interactive. The method one chooses to carry out a research project is driven, to a large 
extent, by the questions posed and the problems that intrigue the researcher (Baker 1994). 
Among social sciences, (Singleton et al, 1988), there are four primary research strategies 
for understanding the world: experiments, surveys, field research and the use of available 
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data. Accordingly, a particular discipline will favour a particular strategy in conducting 
their social research.   
 
In this particular research, it was important to capture the complex social lives of 
individuals through detailed interviews, a thing that cannot easily be done through 
surveys. More importantly, I anticipated that I would be dealing with particularly 
complex employment relations and that exploration of such issues requires a qualitative 
approach. Use of this method was aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of the 
emotional feelings of workers who were affected by restructuring.   
 
3.1 Research Techniques 
The research process is made up of a series of steps, techniques, exercises as well as 
events that can be applied to every sphere of life (Singleton. et al, 1988). Data collection, 
as explained earlier, can take different forms. Methods such as interviews, case studies, 
participant observation and others all form part of the data collection process.  
 
Being an investigative study, semi-structured interviews and detailed interviews were 
used as the main components of this research. However, other methods complemented 
the collection of data. Each strategy of data collection has its own strengths and 
weaknesses (Singleton, et al, 1988) that make a researcher favour one method over the 
other in different situations. However, as these authors argue, it is advisable to study a 
given problem with a variety of methods so that the weakness of a particular method can 
be supplemented by another. 
 
In studying the impact of restructuring on labour, I prepared both semi-structured 
interviews and structured questionnaires for purposes of extracting written information 
from various respondents. A case study on one of the privatized local water utility 
companies in the Copperbelt region of Zambia, Nkana Water and Sewerage Company, 
provided valuable insights into the feelings of workers who previously worked under a 
public enterprise but which haw been privatized. I anticipated that being an essential 
service provider, it would not be possible to access as many workers as expected for 
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personal interviews and this demanded that alternative plans for soliciting data through 
structured questionnaires be considered, given the limited time available to conduct this 
research.  
In social research, certain factors necessitate studying a sample rather than the whole 
population (Nkata, 1993) and these factors can be influenced by time, budgetary and 
logistical constraints. Here a set can be described as a small but representative part of a 
whole. The choice of Zambia (economic and political differences notwithstanding) as a 
country and Nkana Water and Sewerage represent units of analysis at regional level and 
industry level, respectively. As Nkata (1993) suggests, research budgets and logistical 
constraints can be reduced when a study is based on a sample than when it is based on all 
elements of a phenomenon. 
 
3.2 Interviews and questionnaires 
As indicated above, for this research, a structured questionnaire was designed and 
administered among the employees of the water utility company while a semi-structured 
interview schedule was made for interviews with other sources who included employers, 
trade unionists and others. The purpose of the interviews was to collect detailed 
information about the changes that had taken place both at industry level and at the level 
of workers. In selecting respondents at the Water Company, the criteria were to target 
workers who had served both under the firm as a public utility and now as a private 
entity. It was believed that such people were better placed to provide the kind of 
experience this research needed to draw on in order to ground its theory. Interviews were 
conducted with the company management and union officials, an association of former 
miners and the Mineworkers Union of Zamia.   
 
As suggested by Payne and Payne (2004) interviews with workers are an important 
instrument of data collection through face to face settings using a question and answer 
format. As for the research conducted in the five countries in the regional, it was 
inevitable to use unstructured interviews by applying the snowball method to collect data 
from respondents. This was largely because of the difficulties experienced in securing 
appointments for interviews prior to embarking on the research. The interviews mainly 
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targeted government leaders, trade unionists and officials from chambers of industry and 
commerce.   
 
The direction of the interviews largely depended on who was being interviewed and 
indeed what the interview was about. As argued by Payne and Payne (2004), there are 
survey interviews, where information is collected from large numbers of people and in-
depth interviews which mainly targeted at a smaller number of people. As for in-depth 
interviews, which is now commonly applied in sociological research, there are semi-
structured (or focused) interviews based on usually a few open-ended questions and the 
unstructured  (non-directive) interview normally aimed at drawing out the experiences, 
opinions and feelings from the respondents (Payne and Payne, 2004). 
 
As pointed out by Singleton et al (1988) field research is intrinsically a matter of 
immersing oneself in a naturally occurring (rather than a staged) set of events where the 
researcher wants to collect first hand knowledge of the situation. It is important, 
therefore, that the researcher tries as much as possible to understand the world through 
the lens of his or her subjects and to collect information without necessarily unduly 
influencing its shape and content. The information generated from these interviews and 
questionnaires was exceptionally useful in assisting me understand the economic and 
social situation under which the workers were adjusting to a changed work environment. 
The interviews conducted in different countries of the region, also provided detailed 
structural information and how the region was responding to the process of international 
economic restructuring or globalisation. Government leaders and trade unionists both 
catalogued the challenges they were facing the in the light of the economic restructuring 
necessitated by the global economic influence. 
 
3.3 Case Study 
The case study approach in research is usually an examination of one unit. Nkata (1993) 
argues that the degree to which findings are to be generalized is often a deciding factor on 
which approach to opt for. This is because a study of relatively more units, though costly, 
is much more useful in producing reliable generalization than would be the case with one 
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unit. The single unit faces the danger of being exceptional than representative of a 
category of phenomenon (Nkata, 1993). However, I argue that a detailed research of a 
single unit can also be useful in building a comprehensive impression of an existing 
situation.   Therefore, the case study of the water utility company  in Zambia,  to asses the 
impact of restructuring on workers and their households was useful in producing results 
that were representative of other privatised companies. 
 
For this research, my target was to conduct twenty detailed interviews with workers at the 
water company using both personal interviews and self administered questionnaires. As 
stated earlier, structured questionnaires were distributed to twenty employees of the water 
utility company. These questionnaires were handed out to workers who had served in 
both the pre- and post-privatisation eras. Out of the twenty questionnaires given out, there 
were nine responses while eleven of the potential respondents did not respond to the 
questionnaires. In addition there were five face to face interviews conducted with 
workers and one with a retrenched employee. The aim of these questionnaires and 
interviews was to establish the possible social consequences of the restructuring and to 
consider how households have responded to the shock of the decline in formal-sector 
employment.  
 
Although it was initially thought that personal interviews were the best approach of 
obtaining the required data from workers on the impact of restructuring at the workplace, 
this approach later proved difficult to pursue. While this approach worked well with 
union officials and management, it proved problematic when it came to approaching 
individual workers. This approach proved problematic for two reasons. Firstly, workers 
were uncomfortable and extremely reluctant to be interviewed for a number of reasons 
but all of which centred on the fear of victimisation. This was despite assurances from the 
researcher and union officials that this research was an independent study specifically 
meant for academic purposes. Despite assurances that protection would be provided by 
the non disclosure of the respondent’s names, the workers still remained apprehensive. 
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Secondly, given the essential nature of service provided by the company, it was almost 
impossible to keep an employee off the job for close to forty-five minutes. Some of the 
workers were field workers, meaning that they spent most their time attending to client 
complaints for the larger part of the day. It was, therefore, difficult to access such 
workers for in-depth interviews. However, through the assistance of the union leadership, 
I managed to get at least five employees to talk to, although the number fell far short of 
the anticipated number of respondents. 
 
This therefore demanded a change in strategy. Instead of meeting workers at an 
individual level, detailed questionnaires were given out to twenty employees while 
continuing with efforts of securing face to face interviews. It is also imperative to 
reiterate that the interviews conducted through questionnaires and face to face approach 
during the case study are in addition to the other interviews that were conducted with 
various respondents in Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia, during the 
exploratory study as well as those conducted with union officials at the Mineworkers 
Union of Zambia, the Association for the Welfare of Former Miners in Zambia and an 
academic at the University of the Witwatersrand. . 
 
3.4 Available Data 
A range of printed resources acquired during this research also proved useful in 
enhancing my knowledge and understanding of issues within the context of the subject 
under research. Obviously, it was important that I avoid duplicating data collection by 
looking at what had already been collected through other research activities. The search 
for secondary data was conducted by accessing, among others, daily newspapers reports, 
journals, internet articles, library sources, official records, public documents, other 
researched articles, books and dissertations. These documents help in generating new 
knowledge, new approaches as well as valuable new findings (Baker, 1994) by bringing 
to the fore a number of facts and figures. As Baker explains, many social research 
projects can equally rely on data previously collected for other topics. Written records 
proved particularly useful when collecting data from the region as this provided country 
data which deepened my understanding of specific issues of interest related to the this 
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research. This was in view of the time constraint that this research faced given the limited 
period of stay in each country of the four of the five countries visited, apart from Zambia 
which is the researcher’s permanent home of residence. However, the variety and 
diversity of data collected from written documents was overwhelming. 
 
In demonstrating how important written records are in social research, Singleton et al 
(1988) allude to Emile Durkheim, one of the earliest sociologists to make use of official 
records – in this case “death records” – in a classic study on suicide (1951). In this study, 
Durkheim used statistics on suicide rates obtained from official publications in several 
European countries and related them to such variables as religion, season of the year, 
gender and marital status. According to Singleton Jr. et al (1988), Durkheim ultimately 
arrived at “his influential theory” that a lack of social integration contributed to suicides 
while rejecting several hypotheses popular at that time which claimed that suicide was as 
a result of “mental illness and the rate of suicide increased with temperature” (1988: 
327). 
 
In order to get an overall impression of the impact of rapid economic restructuring on the 
labour market, the research drew on data from existing records on labour market statistics 
in the various countries, including Zambia. Statistics analyzing employment trends in 
these countries were obtained from Central Bank records and from the national Central 
Statistics Offices. In the case of Zambia, The Ministry of Labour and the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) in Lusaka were key to providing data on employment trends, 
investment and privatisation issues. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
As shown earlier, this research applied both qualitative and quantitative. This means the 
findings contained in the study are based on the analysis of data from both methods. 
Qualitative data analysis was quite challenging but went on well in this research. The 
researcher was the sole instrument in both collection of data and processing of this data. 
Generally, efforts were made to ensure that broader, contextual issues that seem to 
influence the phenomenon under study were given appropriate recognition in the 
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development of the theory. This was done by recognising, acknowledging and accounting 
for such contextual issues.  
 
The process of analysis was, thus, guided by the research question. Here, the method of 
grounded theory (Baggie and Mouton, 1998) was applied where researchers are allowed 
to study a relatively unknown social phenomenon around which no specified theory may 
exist. Through data collection and analysis, a theory emerged which speaks to the 
phenomenon being studied. It is, however, important to bear in mind that hypotheses are 
not handled through statistical analysis only but include numerical analysis (Nkhata, 
1993). In other words, Nkhata suggests that qualitative analysis, the making of inferences 
is purely logical – with no calculations involved.  
 
3.6 Limitations of the Research 
The most obvious limitation in this research was that of time constraint. Particularly, at 
the regional level, the time factor was problematic as only two days were allocated for 
research activities in all the countries except for Zambia. There were also difficulties 
encountered in communicating with the possible sources of information. The researcher 
resorted to the snowball method of making contact with sources. This had a limiting 
factor on the amount of data collected as the time allocated for interviews, in places were 
no initial arrangements were made, was shorter than those were the researcher was being 
expected. 
 
In the case of Zambia, arranged interviews with policy makers ran into a hitch as the 
research was being conducted at a time the country was gearing itself towards tripartite 
elections. Cabinet had just been dissolved and all policy makers were out carrying out 
their election campaigns. Top senior civil servants who were left to oversee the running 
of government ministries were also out accompanying the state president on campaign 
meetings. The other limiting factor is that the case study focused on one of the many 
water companies in the country that have so far been privatised. Therefore, being a study 
of only one firm makes its difficult to derive maximum benefits in terms of coverage, 
which can only be achieved by conducting a nationwide or large scale study at a huge 
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cost and which requires more time than was available for this research. Close to this 
limitation is the fact that the researcher was the only instrument in data collection through 
interviews, as opposed to instances were research assistants are recruited to conduct 
interviews. 
 
Conversely, it can be argued that this limitation on the scope does not deprive the 
research of the depth or intensity gained from the case study research. However, it is 
important that further research is carried out to ascertain whether the findings of this 
research can be valid generally. 
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Chapter Four  
4.0 Divergent paths of colonialism, liberation and liberalisation in Southern 
Africa 
 
In order to understand the current process of globalisation, it is necessary to locate the 
present developments taking place in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular, 
into the historical developments that have characterised the African continent over 
centuries. The process of capitalist development in Africa is not a new phenomenon. It 
dates back to the days of slavery when imperialist powers started the division of Africa to 
further their imperialistic ends. Africa has also, for centuries, served as a source for raw 
materials used in the industrialisation processes of the developed countries. It is also 
important to note that colonialism in Africa played a role in the emergence of inequalities 
in society through the expropriation of land and commodification of labour. Although 
there are similarities in the way colonialists asserted their rule on the African continent, 
there are distinct divergences in the way this process was carried out and the impacts on 
society in individual countries.  
 
However, a common feature is that all the regions of the continent have experienced 
some form of transformation from what they previously were. According to Ake (1981), 
those who do not have the means of production only have their labour power to fall back 
on. Therefore, the basic relation of production in capitalist society is the relation between 
the few who own the means of production and many who do not own such means except 
for their labour power. As Ake (1981) points out, “this is a relation of gross inequality, of 
subordination and domination, of exploitation and antagonism” (1981:14). 
 
Therefore, the colonial state has been reinforced in the post colonial era in that the 
indigenous bourgeoisie which took over government at independence lacked a secure 
material base and used political power for accumulation (Ake, 1981). Just like the 
colonial era, workers in post-colonial capitalism are stripped of their independent means 
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of subsistence and are left with only their labour power to sell to capitalists. As the state 
retreats from its role of providing universal social welfare, society begins to see more of 
people’s survival and livelihoods being threatened. Whether current efforts to deglobalise 
and decommodify can succeed, is beyond the scope of this research paper.  
 
According to Webster, due to increased competition there has emerged multiple 
trajectories in the changing employment relations where some people in society are 
“earning a living” through paid regular employment while others are “making a living” 
through creating their own means of survival in unpaid activities (2005: 65). Webster 
suggests that while at a broad level, the “imperatives of an increasingly global system of 
accumulation are profoundly changing employment relations, there is no unilinear 
response to liberalisation” (2005: 65). Drawing on Polanyi’s study of the disruptive social 
effects of rapid marketisation and the counter-movement principle, Webster (2005) 
suggests that as the pendulum swings towards the “commodification of labour”, it 
provokes strong counter-movements demanding protection.  
 
While Western capital appears to encourage and propagate the ideology of development 
in Africa, it is clear that the industrialised countries also perpetuate the existence of 
exploitative ties between Africa and Western economies. It is also clear that countries in 
Southern Africa, like any other developing region in the world, have sought divergent 
paths to development since attaining independence. Some have achieved some measure 
of success in broadening access to education and health services and raising the average 
standards of living while others have recorded economic decline. Botswana provides the 
clearest example of a country in the region which has, for long, maintained a consistent 
growth economy with regular budgetary surplus (Dixon and Heffernan, 1991).  
 
Globalisation in Southern African region has obviously created changes in patterns of 
trade, investment, technological advancements and has allowed the free movement of 
people and goods. The question, however, is whether such benefits and changes have 
impacted positively on the people of the region? Can the region claim any gains from the 
outcomes of globalisation? If not, what measures can be taken to make the process 
  46
 
 
beneficial to the region? The study will now focus on the specific national situations of 
individual countries and how they are participating in the process of economic 
liberalisation. I now explore the divergences of economic liberalisation by the five 
countries in the region. 
 
4.1 NAMIBIA 
Growth, Investment and Employment 
Namibia has enjoyed a generally stable economy since independence in 1990. Despite a 
stable economic environment, the country has experienced a decline in economic growth 
from five per cent during the 1991 -1995 period to around 3.5 during the 1996-2003 
period. This economic growth rate remains positive compared to the pre-independence 
era when the country’s real Gross Domestic Product growth recorded slightly over one 
per cent (Gaomab II, 2005).  
 
Before independence, the colonialists used cheap Namibian labour in production. This 
practice seems to have continued in the post independence era, where human labour is 
seen as, what Polanyi calls, a ‘fictitious commodity’. Overly, capitalist relations of 
production particularly in Namibia’s mining sector are highly exploitative and 
oligopolistic (Dixon and Heffernan, 1991). The sector is dominated by large corporations 
with common policies regarding employment conditions, labour relations and 
negotiations with the state. As Dixon and Heffernan (1991) write, the severe exploitation 
of labour and other illegitimate practices have contributed to huge profits earned for mine 
owners in South Africa and other Western parent corporations.  
 
Namibia’s transition from an economy with strong social policies towards an open 
economy is part of a broader process for the integration of the national economy into the 
global economy. The exploitation of Namibian workers in the mining and textile sectors, 
including those in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) is illustrative of Polany’s 
argument on the re-commodification of labour. According to Polanyi cited by Block, “it 
is wrong to treat nature and human beings as objects whose price will be determined 
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entirely by the market. Such a concept violates the principles of that have governed 
societies for centuries, where nature and human life have always been recognised as 
having a sacred dimension” (2001: xxv). This is illustrated by the case of Ramatex below. 
Labour Relations and Employment 
As stated earlier, Namibia’s economy is heavily dependent on its primary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy. In 1990, the Namibian labour force stood at 500 000, with the 
tertiary sector accounting for about 185 000 formal sector workers (Africafiles, 1993). By 
2000, the agricultural sector employed about 123 297 people while 47 517 jobs were 
recorded in the community, social and personal services sector and 39 850 in the 
wholesale and retail sector. The country, like others in the region has suffered from the 
impact of the severe drought which has forced a fall in beef prices resulting in some farm 
workers being declared redundant, following the closure of some meat factories.  
Table 2:  Estimated Employment Figures and Unionisation Rates in Namibia  
 
SECTOR 
APPOROXIMATE 
NUMBER OF 
EMPOLYEES 
ESTIMATED UNIONISTION 
RATE (signed-up members)1 
Agriculture 29 200 9 000 (31%) 
Manufacturing, Building and 
Construction 
28 900 10 500 (36%) 
Mining and Energy 4 800 4 000 (83%) 
Food, Fishing, Wholesale, Retail 
and Hospitality 
34 000 22 000 (65%) 
Textile 9 000 6 000 (67%) 
Public Service, Parastatals and 
Municipalities (excluding army, 
police and teachers) 
80 000 60 000 (75%) 
Teachers 15 000 12 000 (80%) 
Domestic Work (private 
households) 
17 900 3 500 (20%) 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 
24 000 4 500 (19%) 
Transport, communication and 
Security 
12 000 3 000 (25%) 
Other 22 700 6 000 (26%) 
TOTAL 277 500 140 700 (50,7%) 
                                                 
1 Signed-up membership refers to the number of workers who applied for union membership and received 
their membership cards.  The number of paid-up members (those whose membership fees are received by 
unions on a monthly basis) is likely to be about 20% lower than the signed-up membership. 
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Source:  Labour  Resource and Research Institute (2004) 
As can be noted from the table, the public service and the food industry together with the 
manufacturing sector have dominated in terms of employment. It is also clear that the 
level of unionisation tends to be higher in the public sector than the other sectors. This is 
illustrated in the banking, insurance and real estate sector which employees about 24 000 
but only 4500 are unionised, representing only 19 per cent.  
Though relatively small, the trade union movement in Namibia is focused on developing 
its capacity in order to represent its members better. The Namibian Labour Act was 
enacted in November 1992, repealing previous existing laws and this signified a dramatic 
gain for Namibian workers. Essentially, the new Act provides a framework for regulating 
labour relations which encourages collective bargaining between employers and trade 
unions. Among other things, it provides for the right to strike in certain circumstances, 
for access to employer premises for the purpose of trade union organization and for 
means by which to redress what are commonly considered to be unfair labour practices. 
“In essence, the new Act provides a framework for regulating labour relations which 
encourages collective bargaining between employers and trade unions.” (Africafile,1993: 
30).  But this Act is seen as weighing heavily against employers and this has prompted 
government to apply to the Ministry of Labour authorities for exemptions in the 
implementation of certain provisions of the Act.  
The Act also provides for the establishment of the Tripartite Labour Advisory Council 
and the setting up of wage commissions to determine minimum wages in various sectors. 
More importantly, a formal collective bargaining framework was established through the 
Act. However, following identification weak points in the Act by social partners (unions, 
government and employers), it was agreed in 2004 that a new Labour Bill be introduced 
to address the various contentious issues, although the unions are not comfortable with 
some of the provisions in the proposed Bill.  
Investment 
The government in Namibia sees the flow of foreign investment as one that can stimulate 
growth in the country. The Namibian government has been attracting foreign investment 
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into the country in order to create jobs and reduce poverty levels. Through policies of 
deregulation and liberalisation, the economic environment in Namibia has changed and 
has seen the introduction of Export Processing Zones (EPZ)s, among other developments. 
Through the establishment of EPZs, the government hoped to attract foreign investment 
in the country to boost up the manufacturing sector and ultimately increase the country’s 
export base. After passing the EPZ Act in 1995, it was hoped that 25 000 jobs would be 
created in Namibia just before the year 2000.  
Although a large part of foreign investment has gone into the mining sector, other sectors 
such as manufacturing have also seen investment flowing in through the establishment of 
textile industries. But this investment has come at a huge cost to the workers of Namibia. 
This study found that there were numerous complaints raised by union leaders in the 
manner their members were being treated by managements of foreign companies. Despite 
the assurances by investors about the benefits their investment were bringing into 
Namibia, it was found that there was a high level of abuse of workers’ right in some of 
the foreign companies. One such textile firm is Ramatex, whose case is presented below. 
The Case of Ramatex 
One of the biggest investments under the Namibian EPZs programme is the establishment 
of a textile company called Ramatex, a Malaysian company which opened its operations 
in 2002. Since its inception, Ramatex has been at the centre of industrial controversy in 
Namibia due to the high number of worker abuses that have been recorded at the 
company. With an initial work force of between 6000 and 6700 at the time of starting its 
operations, which has now reduced to somewhere around 5000, Ramatex has grossly 
abused workers with the full knowledge of government authorities. There have been 
numerous reports ranging from discrimination during recruitment, physical and verbal 
abuse, unfair labour practices and exposure of workers to hazardous conditions in 
addition to slave wages paid to workers. Despite numerous meetings and representation 
made by the Namibian Food and Allied Workers Union (NAFAU), which organises 
Ramatex workers, little or nothing has been done to redress the situation. In fact, it was 
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reported that union officials were often reprimanded by government officials and other 
political leaders for “threatening the existence of Ramatex” in Namibia.  
This, clearly, demonstrates signs of a weak state in Namibia, which has failed to mitigate 
the harsh effects of the market (Block, 2001). The special status accorded to Ramatex by 
government certainly allows management of Ramatex to enjoy special protection from 
authorities on grounds that the company was creating employment for Namibians. 
Besides, there is evidence that Ramatex has enjoyed a special and exclusive set of 
incentives offered by the Namibian government for choosing to invest in that country. 
The Namibian government provided N$100 million of Namibian public funds to the 
Ramatex by way of setting up infrastructure for the company. Whereas, the Namibian 
citizens where highly expectant for jobs from the new company, it was revealed that 
Ramatex was bringing in hundreds of unskilled and semi-skilled workers from 
Bangladesh, who were dubiously brought into the country by agents of Ramatex. Such 
workers, however, are said to have had a rude shock when they were sent back to 
Bangladesh by Ramatex for being ‘incompetent’. This was after some of them had sold 
off all they had, back in their home country, in anticipation for a better living in Namibia. 
The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) also questioned the government’s 
wisdom in granting hundreds of work permits to workers from Bangladesh to perform 
jobs that could adequately be performed by Namibians. 
A visit to Ramatex textile complex along Katutura road in Windhoek revealed scores of 
Namibians milling around the textile complex’s front gate in search of jobs. Desperation 
for employment and naked abuse of Namibian workers’ rights at Ramatex are still serious 
issues to contend with. As Herbert Jauch of the Labour Resource and Research Institute 
(LaRRI) in Namibia, observes in ‘The Namibian Worker’ (October, 2004), “protected by 
the blind faith that  globalisation and foreign investment will solve their development 
problems, host countries soon realize that such international corporations only contribute 
to driving down labour and environment standards. Ramatex is said to have polluted 
water in nearby streams with its toxic waste from the factory.    This, as argued by Silver 
(2003), shows clearly how states have traded their sovereignty and the citizen’s rights for 
foreign investment.  
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According to LaRRI, the case of Ramatex also presents a stark example of how the 
process of globalisation can pit African countries against each other as they compete for 
foreign investment. Namibia had to offer incredible concessions to Ramatex in order to 
clinch the US$167 million deal, ‘beating’ South Africa and Madagascar who were also 
being considered as possible investment destinations.   
 
Several meetings held with trade union leaders in Windhoek and Swakopmund revealed 
that there were many trade union and worker rights abuses taking place in many of the 
companies situated in the various EPZs in Namibia and employing over 12 000 people. 
Union activities are restricted, under Namibian laws, in such areas for the first four years 
of a company’s establishment.  This contrasts sharply with the promise of quality jobs by 
multinational corporations.  
 
While workers at Ramatex had initially hoped for better working conditions from the 
investment, the coming of Ramatex has failed to lead to the expected economic and 
social changes. As Burawoy (1999) argues, the state appears to be aligning its interests 
with those of the market fundamentalists and has, thus, abrogated its role of protecting 
labour. While failing to stimulate domestic investment, the state has opened the 
floodgates to exploitative foreign investment which has been left free to destroy the 
social order (Burawoy, 1999). This view is also supported by the argument by Block 
(2001), who asserts that the neo-liberals continue to embrace the same utopian vision and 
have failed to appreciate the enormous pressures and demands that market liberalism puts 
on ordinary people. The industrial conflicts that have characterised labour relations at 
Ramatex are reflective of Block’s view that the utopian vision of neo-liberalism leads to 
intensified conflict which has contributed to the marginalisation of the workers. 
 
Perhaps, the continuing decline of the power of the working class signifies the absence of 
the necessary institutional framework through which the state can control the market. As 
Block (2001) argues, markets can only work efficiently and dynamically in the presence 
of the necessary institutional framework. In this sense, the centrality of the state in any 
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market economy becomes one of particular importance (Burawoy, 2001). When state 
policies move in the direction of disembedding by heavily relying on market self-
regulation, ordinary people, including the working class, are forced to bear higher costs 
(Block, 2001). 
 
4.2 SWAZILAND 
Economically, Swaziland is highly dependent on the agricultural sector, with sugar as the 
country’s leading export. The country is classified as a middle income developing 
country.  Other industries include the pulp and lumber industry based on the country’s 
cultivated forests, the pineapple and other citrus fruits industry as well as cotton which all 
contribute to the country’s export base. In recent years, a chain of textile industries has 
been established in the Matsapa area near Manzini. Most of these industries were 
attracted to invest in Swaziland with the help of the Swaziland Industrial Development 
Company (SIDC) and the Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority (SIPA). Swaziland 
has for many years served as a labour reservoir for South Africa and up to some stage, its 
economic life was virtually under the control South Africa (Dixon and Heffernan, 1991).  
 
Swaziland, like Lesotho, exemplifies the most extreme forms of neo-colonial 
independence within the region, which have heavily depended on South African capital 
in spheres such as mining, manufacturing, hotel and tourism (Dixon and Heffernan, 
1991). Similar to the phases of dynamic processes in the post-communist market 
transition Polanyi speaks of in Burawoy (2001), Swaziland has undergone and continues 
to undergo post-independence transition from a socialist-based economy to a market led 
economy. The rise of the market-led economy in Swaziland has sparked spontaneous 
reaction from the trade unions and other social movements. This is similar to changes 
Polanyi refers to when he discusses the reaction against the market in England by civil 
society and how the commodification of labour brings about cultural degradation and 
demoralisation (Burawoy, 2001).   
 
Swaziland’s population is on the increase and this means an expansion in the labour 
force. Given that South Africa is now more concerned with providing employment to its 
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own citizens more than focusing on migrant labour, Swaziland’s figures of migrant 
labour to South Africa have been on the decline in recent years. Similarly, argues 
Snyman (1992), as the recession in South Africa takes its toll, Swaziland’s closely 
associated manufacturing sector will continue to experience a decline. 
 
Investment and Employment 
Foreign investment in Swaziland has been the main driving force in promoting growth in 
the country’s economy and by the mid-1980s, with the depreciation of the national 
currency, Swaziland exports were competing favourably on the international market, with 
the European Union (EU) and South Africa being the main customers. This helped 
control the flow of imports and also helped the country enjoy some surplus in trade. In 
2000, Swaziland became eligible for the African growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
and subsequently qualified for the Apparel provision in 2001. About 30 000 jobs were 
created, mostly among women, under AGOA through the Apparel industry. Textile 
exports, however, began to experience a down turn in 2005 due to increased global 
competition and the termination of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC).  
 
The decline in textile production, precipitated by the expiry of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO)’s Multi Fibre Agreement in 2005, led to textile factory closures and 
job lay-offs. According to the Ministry of Labour, most textile companies had to 
introduce flexibility at the workplace in order to “keep business competitive” (Labour 
Department Report, 2004). Given that population growth is outpacing economic growth, 
this means life is getting worse for the average Swazi. The average unemployment rate in 
Swaziland is about 40 percent, but higher in the rural areas. The closure of major 
manufacturing companies in the urban areas, retrenchment from South African mines, 
and limited domestic employment opportunities are some of the key causes of such a high 
unemployment rate (FAO Report, 2002).  
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Table 3: Employment in Swaziland  from 1996 - 2000 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Formal 
Employment 
94 766 95 681 91 874 93 213 93 962 
Private 
Sector 
63 497 64 122 59 983 61 003 61 109 
Public Sector 31 269 31 559 31 891 32 210 32 853 
Informal 
Employment 
16 877 17 063 17 311 17 563 17 616 
Total 
Employment 
111 643 112 744 109 185 110 776 111 578 
% change, 
year on year  
0.6 1.0 -3.2 1.5 0.7 
Migrant 
Mineworkers 
14 725 12 960 10 336 9 160 N/A 
 
Source: Central Bank of Swaziland 
 
However, while the Department of Labour in the country claims that Swaziland’s 
participation in the global market has brought economic benefits to thousands of local 
Swazis who have sought employment in the textile industry, trade unions complain of 
low labour standards in most of the foreign companies in the country. Sentiments from 
the General Secretary of the Swaziland and Processing, Refining and Allied Workers 
Union, Mdududzi Gina  and Secretary General of the Swaziland federation of Trade 
Unions (SFTU) Jan Sithole, clearly point to the existence of a lot of worker rights  abuses 
in the textile industry2. As Mduduzi explains, “there is a lot of labour mobility among 
                                                 
2 Author interviews with Sithole and Mduduzi on 28 November 2006 in Manzini, Swaziland 
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workers in the textile industry as workers seek better conditions in different textile firms. 
Although the general labour laws apply to workers in the textile industry, our members 
are treated as though they work in Export Processing Zones”.   Sithole also condemned 
the culture by the textile investors, who are mainly from Taiwan and China, of bringing 
foreigners from their countries to take jobs in Swaziland.  
 
Based on the thinking of Polanyi (2001), it can be argued that economic liberalisation in 
Swaziland has meant making human society subservient to the economic mechanism. 
Clearly, as the market asserts itself in Swaziland, human labour is being re-commodified 
and the protection that workers previously enjoyed is being removed. The removal of 
protection has created an unfettered labour market but workers have been placed under 
the threat of starvation if they failed to comply with the rules of wage labour (Polanyi, 
2001). Evidence shows that the working class in Swaziland is not getting any protection 
from the state and, as Burawoy (1999) argues, it seems the state has been captured by 
short sighted classes who mercilessly pursue their own narrow economic interests. The 
state has failed to represent the general interest of the workers and population at large 
against the market (Burawoy, 1999).    
 
Social Dialogue 
 
Although there is in existence a legal framework for the tripartite consultations in 
Swaziland on labour and social policy matters, the process is undermined by lack of a 
national constitutional environment. There are reports of state harassment of trade union 
leaders despite the fact that the Industrial Relations Act provides for the right to form 
associations, including unions. Vincent Ncongwane of the Swaziland Federation of 
Labour holds the view that social dialogue has not been as effective as it should have 
been. Thus says Ncongwane, “social dialogue in Swaziland is not working well in the 
face of a highly volatile political situation. There are no reasonable benefits from social 
dialogue for labour”.3  
 
                                                 
3 Author interview with Vincent Ncongwane on 29 November 2005 in Mbabane, Swaziland 
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Labour Standards 
Trade unions in Swaziland, particularly those in the textile industry, speak of difficulties 
they face in dealing with issues affecting their members. They claim that foreign 
investors enjoy some measure of protection from government as inducement to them to 
continue operating in the country. Unions accuse Government of deliberately ignoring to 
enforce local labour laws and international labour standards for fear that once these were 
enforced, the investors would relocate to other countries.  There were also reports that 
those retrenched from the textile industry were given minimal severance packages while 
female workers did not receive any paid maternity leave contrary to existing labour laws. 
The Swaziland Federation of trade Unions blames the rising spate of worker abuses in the 
textile and other industries to increased biased government interference in issues 
affecting workers.  
 
The Labour Department did not also carry out regular inspections in factories to monitor 
worker abuses. For instance in 2004, “the Factories Inspectorate operated with only five 
inspectors for the whole year. This section is facing a serious shortage of manpower and 
transport” (Labour Department Report, 2004). Given the staffing deficiencies in the 
inspectorate section of the Department of labour, lack of regular inspections has 
precipitated the continued existence of sub-standard working conditions in foreign 
companies and consequently exposing workers to hazardous conditions. There was also 
evidence that management in various industries dismissed workers for engaging in union 
activities and such acts were reportedly prevalent in the textile industry.  
 
Swaziland can, therefore, be described as a country that has achieved some measure of 
economic growth through economic liberalisation policies but whose poverty levels 
remain high. The continued insistence by the government on economic openness has had 
a profound impact on the domestic labour market. The opening up of the economy to 
foreign investors, particularly in the textile industry, has had serious implications on 
wages and conditions of service of the Swazi workers. It is also true that Swaziland and 
South Africa share a historical economic relationship and as such, South Africa’s 
political independence has implications the trade relationship between the two countries. 
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The incorporation of Swaziland into the capitalist system achieved little in reducing 
poverty levels while on the hand increasing exploitative forms of labour use, 
unemployment and underemployment. However, it can be concluded that the decline in 
direct foreign investment coupled with a reduction in labour migration to South African 
mines and the state’s inability to create sufficient jobs have contributed to high 
unemployment and poverty in Swaziland. 
 
BOTSWANA 
Botswana is one of Africa's most stable countries economically and prides itself of being 
Africa’s longest continuous multi-party democracy with a population of approximately 
1.8 million people. It is relatively free of corruption and has a good human rights record. 
As a middle income country, Botswana’s economy is heavily reliant on diamond 
production, although in recent years there have been attempts to reduce this dependence 
by exploiting other non-mining sectors such as tourism. The mining sector through 
diamonds has been the country’s economic mainstay for the last 30 years or so, with a 
contribution of 35 per cent to the country’s GDP and accounting for 82 per cent export 
earnings (SADC Review, 2005).   
 
Botswana is one of the countries in the region that has had strong social policies since 
independence. The country has provided free education and health services among other 
social benefits. Even with pressure from the developed world to liberalise, Botswana has 
not opened its economy as widely as have done other countries in the region. Botswana 
provides an example of a country whose moral principles have for a long time been 
embedded in the social and political order of the day. However, the question today from a 
Polanyian perspective is whether after more than 40 years of independence, capital will 
move to free itself from any restrictions set by society or the state. The true implications 
of economic liberalism in Botswana are yet to be seen and whether there will be a 
‘double movement’ with the market defending its prerogatives against what it sees as the 
encroachments of society and politics (Polanyi, 2001). 
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Investment and Employment 
In terms of the country’s engagement in the process of globalisation, the government 
aims to position Botswana to compete effectively in global markets by adjusting its 
economic structure and institutional framework to take advantage of opportunities offered 
by globalisation (SADC Review, 2005). The country has introduced various programmes, 
policies and strategies that are being implemented to drive the economy, including 
provision of requisite infrastructure, maintaining an appropriate macro-economic policy 
regime for private sector initiatives and increasing labour productivity through human 
resources development. 
In recent years, plans by the Botswana government to privatise some of its enterprises 
have been under serious consideration. The government views privatisation as a policy 
that will, among others, promote efficiency, productivity and above all, attract foreign 
investment into the country. Despite public fears and pessimism that privation will fuel 
job losses and only serve foreign interests, government remains optimistic that 
privatisation will bring into the country foreign capital, advanced technology, enhanced 
managerial skills and international market connections. I can also argue that Botswana’s  
move towards a market economy is, partly, a direct response to fears that a planned 
economy can become a shortage economy characterised by inefficiencies (Burawoy, 
1999) but at the same time the state does not want to apply the shock therapy type of 
liberalism.  Overall employment as of the year 2005 stood at 20 per cent as the country 
still faces low skills in technical and managerial fields, despite high literacy levels. 
According to a report by Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
government remains optimistic of skilled labour increasing although the high incidence 
of HIV/AIDS in the country poses a great threat (SADC Review, 2005). The table below 
shows the number of citizens and non-citizens employed in various sectors of the 
economy in Botswana.  
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Table 4: Estimated Number of Paid Employees by Industry, Citizenship and Sex 
  
Citizens Non-Citizens All Employees (Sep-03) 
Industry Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Mar-03
Agriculture 4,652 1,272 5,924 122 219 341 4,774 1,491 6,264      6,464 
Mining & Quarrying 6,797 821 7,618 315 35 350 7,112 856 7,968       7,961 
Manufacturing 12,646 15,951 28,597 1,290 281 1,572 13,936 16,233 30,169    30,164 
Water & Electricity 2,295 471 2,766 49 10 59 2,344 481 2,825      2,839 
Construction 24,478 3,035 27,513 2,166 72 2,238 26,643 3,107 29,750    29,023 
Wholesale & Retail 21,410 17,437 38,847 2,750 469 3,219 24,160 17,906 42,066    41,906 
Hotels & Restaurant 4,073 8,335 12,408 591 222 814 4,664 8,558 13,222    13,046 
Transport & 
Communication 6,688 2,963 9,650 555 72 627 7,243 3,034 10,277    10,141 
Financial Intermediaries 1,928 3,540 5,468 278 24 302 2,206 3,563 5,770      5,639 
Real Estate 9,100 3,096 12,196 860 199 1,059 9,960 3,295 13,255    13,271 
Education 2,684 2,763 5,447 932 742 1,674 3,616 3,505 7,121      7,039 
Health & Social work 464 1,695 2,159 187 207 394 651 1,902 2,553      2,474 
Other Community Serv. 1,309 1,501 2,810 266 168 434 1,575 1,669 3,243      3,135 
Private & Parastatal 98,524 62,879 161,403 10,360 2,719 13,080 108,884 65,599 174,483  173,101 
Private 89,886 58,523 148,409 9,839 2,612 12,452 99,725 61,136 160,861  160,200 
Parastatal 8,638 4,356 12,994 521 107 628 9,159 4,463 13,622    12,901 
Central Government 45,969 39,351 85,320 1,714 666 2,380 47,683 40,017 87,700    86,572 
Education 11,610 17,567 29,177 735 280 1,015 12,345 17,847 30,192    30,192 
Other 34,359 21,784 56,143 979 386 1,365 35,338 22,170 57,508    56,380 
Local Government 13,170 9,802 22,972 139 89 228 13,309 9,891 23,200    22,242 
All Sectors 157,663 112,032 269,695 12,214 3,474 15,688 169,876 115,506 285,382  281,915 
  
Source: Central Statistics Office of Botswana 
From the table above, it is clear that in contrast to other countries, the private and 
parastatal sectors in Botswana remain the major employer employers with over 174 000 
employees. This, perhaps, can be explained by the heavy presence of the state in directing 
the economic destiny where the issue of employment has been given significant priority. 
Given the country’s relatively small population, it is evident that Botswana’s employment 
levels are much higher when compared to other countries in the region. The much 
cautious approach to opening up its economy to capitalist investment has also contributed 
to the country’s stability in employment levels. 
Social Dialogue 
Industrial relations in Botswana are governed by a tripartite structure arrangement where 
employers, trade unions and government relate and are able to handle matters of 
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industrial nature. There is, in existence, pieces of legislation such as the Trade Union Act 
of 1969, which requires that all unions be registered, the Employment (Amendment) Act 
of 1992 which lays down terms of employment and minimum conditions of service for 
employees in the private and parastatal sectors. The Regulation of Minimum Wages 
Order of 1995 provides for minimum wage rates. This clearly shows that the country did 
not have an Industrial Relations Act until the year 2004 when, through the assistance of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), produced the country’s Labour Act. 
Obviously, this came as a relief to the unions. The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions 
(BFTU) Secretary General, Henry Makhale4, says “the new Labour Act has a few 
positive clauses which make it easier for workers to access social justice. We are coming 
from an era where the Minister of labour had absolute control and restrictions which 
inhibited unions from growing”.    
Labour Standards  
The government of Botswana has ratified all the eight core conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation. However, according to the BFTU there is an increase 
in the number of violations of trade union and workers rights in some of the privatised 
and foreign companies. According to Makhale, privatisation has resulted in the loss of 
jobs and some companies have resorted to using contract labour. The unions are trying to 
fight for the protection of workers against violations but they receive little support from 
state authorities while labour inspection by the Ministry of Labour is also weak. As the 
economy moves further towards privatisation, the unions are worried of increased abuse 
and erosion of workers’ rights. As Makhale puts it, “these investors have failed to 
stimulate quality job creation and instead what we are seeing is more and more of 
casualisation of labour. We fear that the worst is yet to come as globalisation takes its toll 
in Botswana”.  
From the evidence above, I can argue that although Botswana has been implementing 
economic liberalisation policies, the country has continued to enjoy economic growth. 
                                                 
4 Author interview with BFTU Secretary General Henry Makhale on 4 December 2005 in Gaborone, 
Botswana 
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The country’s commitment to maintaining sound macro-economic stability has enabled it 
to remain a successful development record. As shown earlier, the success of Botswana’s 
success can be attributed to the heavy presence of the state in the management of the 
country’s economic affairs. The state in Botswana has strategically led and managed 
economic growth with little dependency on foreign aid. In contrast to a country like 
Zambia which applied rapid liberalisation and with a minimal state role, Botswana 
signifies a successful developmental state in Africa. Botswana’s state-led development 
strategy has worked well whereas the same strategy has been blamed for economic 
failure in other African states.  
4.4 LESOTHO 
Lesotho is a low income country that is inseparably linked to South Africa in terms of the 
economy. With a population of about 1.8 million, Lesotho thrives on a fairly liberalised 
economy with Foreign Direct Investment permeating nearly all the main sectors of the 
economy. The country also has strong trade links with the United States which serves as a 
destination for at least 60 per cent of Lesotho’s exports. Other sectors which are vital to 
the economy of the country include manufacturing, water and telecommunications 
sectors. 
Investment and employment 
The textile industry in Lesotho accounts for the largest number of formal sector 
employment in a country grappling with an unemployment rate of about 50 per cent. A 
large number of men from Lesotho work on the mines in South Africa. A diamond mine 
.that has been abandoned since 1982 has been recently re-opened with the potential to 
generate some level of employment and provide for up to 20% of Lesotho’s GDP (SADC 
Review, 2005). The country also remains committed to developing an aggressive 
investment programme aimed at attracting both local and foreign investors. 
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Table 5:  Basotho Mineworkers Employed in South Africa, 1982-2002 
 Average no. employed Average annual wage (M) 
1982 117,641 2,985 
1983 115,327 3,426 
1984 114,041 3,927 
1985 116,223 4,452 
1986 121,450 5,136 
1987 125,934 7,160 
1988 124,781 7,598 
1989 126,733 8,679 
1990 125,786 10,069 
1991 122,188 11,350 
1992 119,596 12,440 
1993 116,129 13,359 
1994 112,722 14,562 
1995 103,744 16,801 
1996 102,162 19,186 
1997 95,913 21,193 
1998 80,445 24,678 
1999 68,604 27,657 
2000 64,907 30,131 
2001 61,412 32,030 
20021 61,778 34,9652 
Sources: Central Bank of Lesotho 
From the table above, the decline in the number of Basotho mineworkers in South Africa 
is clearly evident. The retrenchment of mineworkers in South Africa has taken its toll on 
migrant labour, including those from Lesotho. Therefore, The subsequent inflow of 
retrenched miners returning to Lesotho, many of whom have skills that can hardly be 
exploited in the domestic economy, should be added to the natural growth rate of the 
labour force in Lesotho.The continuous drop in employment figures from the 1980s to the 
year 2002 illustrates the low demand for employment in relation to supply. The escalation 
of unemployment can also be attributed to the diminishing employment prospects in the 
agricultural and government sectors.   
 
Lesotho’s textile industry has, however, experienced declining production in recent years 
due to competition and changes in trade agreements. Deputy General Secretary of the 
Lesotho Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), Raymond Mothep, estimates that 
employment figures in the textile industry have dropped from approximately 56 000 to 
just over 30 000.5  This certainly has had a negative impact on employment levels. As 
                                                 
5 Author interview with Deputy General Secretary of the Lesotho Federation of Trade Unions on 1 
December 2005 
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argued earlier, Lesotho like Swaziland, is a country which exhibits forms of neo-colonial 
independence within the region and has heavily depended on South African capital in 
spheres such as mining, manufacturing, hotel and tourism (Dixon and Heffernan, 1991).  
The situation has been compounded by an equally declining level in mining activities on 
the gold mines in South Africa which has meant retrenchments among most of the 
migrant labour from Lesotho forcing them to return home and increase the number of the 
unemployment. It is estimated that numbers of migrant mineworkers from Lesotho have 
reduced from about 52 926 from 54 171 by last year (Central Bank of Lesotho Quarterly 
Report: 2005). Overly, the decline experienced in the manufacturing sector can be 
attributed to the expiry of the Multi Fibre Agreement and restructuring in the sector.  
However, declining work opportunities at the mines in South Africa have led to major 
reductions in the numbers of Basotho able to travel to work there. Over the last three 
years, mine worker numbers seem to have been relatively stable at about half the total of 
15 years ago (Turner, 2003). However, there is also evidence of other Basotho, including 
women, migrating to South Africa for employment in other sectors such as agriculture 
and retail services. As Turner (2003) shows,  the country has also seen an increase in 
intra-migration of people moving from rural to urban areas, particularly Maseru – the 
capital city. 
Social Dialogue and Labour Standards 
Social dialogue in Lesotho is grounded on a tripartite structure arrangement and all social 
partners are active participants to the process of resolving industrial relations issues. 
Currently, a new Industrial Relations Act is being discussed and is likely to be finalised 
sometime this year. However, by they unions’ self admission, there seems to be more 
problems among the unions themselves in terms of building unity. The fragmentation of 
trade unions has weakened their bargaining position. As Mothep puts it, “we have more 
problems amongst us the three federations which is not healthy for us. We seem to have a 
leadership crisis whose effects are affecting the entire labour movement”.  
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Much as foreign investment has brought jobs to the people of Lesotho, there have also 
been increased violations of workers’ rights and declining labour standards, particularly 
in the textile industry. According to Mothep, most of the textile companies were resisting 
paying above the sector minimum wage of about R800 per month. Mothep says most 
textile employers stuck to the R800 figure claiming that was the official rate that 
government had set and that as a result firms could not pay any higher wages. This 
clearly demonstrates the state’s failure to enforce its regulations for fear of sparking 
capital flight. This position is also espoused by Polanyi’s view, cited by Burawoy (1999), 
when he argues that society would produce classes that will represent the general interest 
to the state and that the state would organise its policies and interventions in accordance 
with those general interests. Unlike Polanyi’s logic of the double movement, it is evident 
that while there is a movement towards the market in Lesotho, there is no movement by 
the state towards social protection (Burawoy, 1999). 
 
Unions complained of difficulties faced during negotiations with textile owners, who 
largely of Asian origin, due to language barriers. According to Victor Tau, the General 
Secretary of the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTEX) and Daniel Maraison of 
the Lesotho Garment and Allied Workers Unions (LECAWU), workers were made to 
work overtime but did not receive any remuneration for it.6 Competition and the desire by 
government to attract and retain foreign investment have contributed to keeping wages at 
low levels. It is also important to state that women dominate the clothing and textile 
industries as well as manufacturing, retail and service sectors. The unions have blamed 
the continued violation of workers’ right on the insufficient capacity within the Labour 
Department’s inspectorate team as there were only 10 labour inspectors against 46 
factories in the textile industry.  
 
However, unions have found a way of dealing with employer abuses in the textile by 
reporting such violations to the buyers of the exports in the US who have opened an 
office in Durban, South Africa for purposes of monitoring such abuses.  Further, the 
unions were not happy that investors were only reaping from the country’s labour without 
                                                 
6 Author interview with the two union leaders in Maseru on 2 December 2005. 
  65
 
 
investing in infrastructure. But why has the working class in Lesotho not built itself into a 
vibrant and aggressive movement to counter violations of workers rights. Perhaps the 
answer lies in what Burawoy (1999) describes as a situation where there is no longer any 
ideology against which to react nor one around which to organise collective forces. As 
Burawoy argues, neo-liberalism upholds the narrow interests of “an imitative, 
intermediating, marauding merchant class” (1999: 14). Further more, argues Burawoy 
(1999), the basis of societal self-organisation in the workplace has been largely declining 
even as the population hangs on to its remnants as the last resort of self defence. 
 On the other hand, Labour Commissioner Mamohale Matsoso supported the 
government’s offer of incentives to foreign investors saying Lesotho, like any other 
country in the world had to attract foreign investors7. She emphasised that given the lack 
of capacity of governments to create sufficient jobs, it becomes necessary for authorities 
to do whatever it takes to bring in as many investors as possible for purposes of creating 
opportunities for jobs and national development. This position by government clearly 
indicates that governments will do anything to attract investment, regardless of the 
conditions that go with such desperate moves.  Matsoso’s view is espoused by Mark 
Bennet from the Lesotho Apparel Project known as Commark Trust, who argued that 
Lesotho was better off with the textile industry than without it.8 In contrast to complaints 
by unions that textile workers were grossly under paid, Bennet argued that “in fact apart 
from wages and overtime, workers got other incentive allowances. Bennet further 
revealed that Commark was currently working towards ensuring that textile workers had 
access to anti-retroviral drugs in view of the high prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
in the country. 
Clearly, as Burawoy (1999) argues, once the state begins to align its interests with those 
of the market fundamentalists, the state abrogates its role of protecting labour. The state 
in Lesotho has seemingly receded and watches impassively as jobs disappear while 
wages are also plummeting. Similarly, Block (2001) shows that when state policies move 
                                                 
7 Author interview with Mamohale Matsoso in Maseru on 1 December 2005 
8 Author interview with Mark Bennet in Maseru on 2 December 2005. 
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in the direction of disembedding by heavily relying on market-self regulation, ordinary 
people are forced to bear higher costs.   
4.5 ZAMBIA 
After the re-introduction of a multiparty political system in 1991, the ruling Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under President Frederick Chiluba, a former trade 
unionist, the government sought to implement an ambitious programme of economic 
reforms. The main thrust of the economic reforms encompassed the removal of the 
protection of the domestic market as well as the abolition of subsidies on consumer 
goods, removal of all forms of controls – prices, exchange rates and the introduction of a 
formidable monetary policy. More importantly, the government embarked on an 
ambitious privatization programme of state-owned enterprises and an elaborate reform 
programme of the civil service. However, despite the implementation of these austerity 
measures, the country’s economy remained in depression, characterised by high levels of 
poverty and unemployment. 
 
Given the decline in formal employment, the country saw a growing informal economy 
characterized by low quality jobs with no form of protection. There were large scale 
retrenchments caused by the restructuring and sale of companies under the privatization 
programme. The high number of job losses was also due to the closure of companies or 
industries that could not compete favourably within the globalised economic system.  
 
With a strong copper-based economy, Zambia was one of the most industrialized and 
urbanized of Africa’s new nation-states (Rakner, 2003:44). Rakner writes that Zambia 
boasted of a Gross National Product (GNP) of close to US$2 billion at independence, 
twice that of South Korea and had one of the highest per capita incomes in independent 
Africa. However two decades later, this once wealthy country was reduced to one of the 
poorest on the African continent. The government’s market controls and price limits, 
without sufficient earnings from copper to subside them, led to shortages and decreased 
production. The country’s GDP between 1975 and 1980 was too weak due to the rapidly 
declining economy (Rakner, 2003). Until copper prices began to plummet, the Zambian 
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government did not show any interest in either the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or 
the loan programmes from the World Bank. But as the country’s economic recession 
deepened, the relationship between Zambia and the IMF began to register a steady rise in 
borrowing, accompanied by stringent conditions. The harsh consequences of the 
IMF/World Bank lending conditionalities began to manifest themselves in increased 
poverty, erosion of real incomes, food shortages and high inflation rates. 
 
Economic reforms 
What sets Zambia apart from the other countries in the region which were covered under 
this study, is the pace of implementation of its economic reforms. Zambia has carried out 
a comprehensive liberalisation of the economy in the last 15 years. While the other four 
countries have been implementing restructuring at a gradual pace, Zambia went for a 
rapid programme of economic restructuring in the hope that the country would recover 
from the serious economic difficulties the country was experiencing. Between 1976 and 
1991, the Zambian government had adopted seven different donor-supported adjustment 
programmes, which comprised policy measures but all these programmes were 
abandoned at one stage or another (McPherson, 1995). This perpetuated the country’s 
economic decline. 
 
When the MMD took over government in 1991, the new government’s priority was to 
stabilize the economy and this meant taking a major policy shift. When it was clear that 
the economy was so close to spiralling out of control, the MMD leadership realized that a 
change in economic and social policies was inevitable and the clearest signal towards this 
approach was in 1992 when the government sought to sharply reduce its budget deficit, 
embark on a privatization programme of parastatal firms, reform the tax system and 
devalue the currency (McPherson, 1995). The real impact of these IMF and World Bank- 
inspired reforms was however felt when the country decided to liberalise trade, liberalise 
agriculture and implement privatization. As Situmbeko and Zulu (2004) write, the 
manufacturing industry, particularly the textile industry, suffered a severe setback when 
the government decided to lower and remove tariffs on imported goods. The increase in 
imported second-hand clothes dealt a death nail on the textile industry when more than 
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140 companies which could not compete with these imports went under (Situmbeko and 
Zulu, 2004).  
 
Zambia’s rapid implementation of reforms resulted into a freefall when contrasted with 
other countries in the region. For instance, in its 2003 Human Development Report, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lists Zambia among the four worst 
performing countries in Africa, together with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra 
Leone and Burundi (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). The major difference being that the 
three other countries are coming from large scale wars while Zambia has not suffered 
from such conflict. However, the full impact and how Zambia has responded to the 
impact of economic restructuring is dealt with in detail under chapter five which focuses 
on Zambia as a case study. 
 
Investment and Employment 
While many economic indicators improved, overall GDP growth remained stagnant over 
the first five years of the reform period (Rakner, 2003). Industry, particularly the 
manufacturing sector, was adversely affected by trade liberalisation. No significant 
progress was made in diversifying exports and copper continued to dominate exports. 
The free market economic system which was expected to usher in an efficient private 
sector dealt a devastating blow on employment in the country. By 2002, through the 
privatisation programme, administered by the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA), more 
than 250 former state owned enterprises had been sold off to private hands. However, it 
was the liberalization of trade that was of serious concern due to the stiff competition that 
local industries were exposed to. It became difficult for local companies to compete with 
international products, whose goods were, in most cases, heavily subsidized by the state 
in their countries. Consequently, most companies succumbed to this competition forcing 
them to either operate at half their capacity or effecting total close down. As a result, 
thousands of workers lost their jobs and were thrown onto the streets. Between 1993 and 
1998, it is estimated that 90 000 workers had been displaced (Koyi, 2003).  
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Privatisation has been one of the strongest component of Zambia’s adherence to the IMF 
and World bank conditionality. As Situmbeko and Zulu (2004) argue, many former state 
companies have collapsed, jobs have been lost and welfare programmes that were 
previously dispensed through parastatals have been discontinued. It is estimated that paid 
employment in mining and manufacturing fell from 140 000 in 1991 to 83 000 in 2000 
(Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). The table below provides some figures indicating the trend 
of formal sector employment in Zambia between 1990 and 2000.  
 
Table 6: Paid Employment in Zambia - 1990 - 2000 
YEAR PUBLIC MINING AND 
MANUFACTURING 
AGICULTURE OTHER TOTAL 
1990    159 000          142 000          80 000     162 000    543 000 
1991    162 000             140 000          78 000     164 000    544 000 
1992    171 000             136 000          82 000     158 000    546 000 
1993    168 000             126 000          83 000     143 000    520 000 
1994    174 000             108 000          79 000     136 000    497 000 
1995    173 000             108 000          69 000     135 000    464 000 
1996    196 000               95 000          68 000     140 000    479 000 
1997    170 000               92 000          59 000     155 000    475 000 
1998    174 000               86 000          59 000     157 000    467 000 
1999    184 000               85 000          60 000     148 000    477 000 
2000    185 000               83 000          50 000     158 000    476 000 
 
Source ZCTU/ICFTU  Study on the impact of globalisation on the labour market in Zambia 
 
The privatization process in Zambia, inspired by global capital, also adversely affected 
people’s access to public services such as water, health, electricity and education due to 
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loss of income and cuts in budgets for social welfare. A large number of formal sector 
workers were shunted into the informal, ill-paid and untaxed underground economy. 
Public services such as the provision of water have been commercialized and consumers 
made to pay commercial rates. Efforts by the state to privatize the electricity supply and 
the telecommunication companies together with the Zambian National Commercial Bank 
have met with stiff resistance from the general public and social movement groups due to 
the inherent negative effects on employment and high service tariffs. 
 
The decline in formal sector employment in Zambia through privatisation, clearly shows 
the devastating effects of the market. Although Block (2001) and Stiglitz (2001) 
recognise the necessity of the of the role of the state in limiting the power of the market, 
it remains highly questionable as to what extent the state in Zambia is able to control the 
power of capital, given the high level of disenchantment among the working class. 
Privatisation, for the workers in Zambia, has meant transition in the opposite direction 
and has led to failure of development and marginalisation of the middle and lower classes 
in society (Burawoy, 2001). As Burawoy (2001) argues, capitalism exploits through the 
destruction of existing systems of production, thus, deepening the class conflict or order 
between the elite and those that are marginalised and dispossessed.  
 
Zambia’s open economy has also attracted foreign investment in areas such as 
agriculture, mining, retail, service and transport sectors. But with this investment, has 
come new forms of labour practices that have impacted negatively on workers. The 
country has witnessed a sharp rise in cases of temporal and casual labour, insecure jobs, 
violation of workers’ rights and poor wages as investors seek to maintain low labour 
costs. Thus, the failure by the state to protect labour as a fictitious commodity, has 
allowed the self-regulating market to destroy the social order that has existed in the 
country since independence, more than forty years ago. As Polanyi, cited by Burawoy 
(2001) writes, labour is now being re-commodified as neo-liberalists continue to embrace 
the same utopian vision that the liberalisation and integration of economies is laying a 
new era of global peace and economic advancement.  
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Consequently, destitution has increased among Zambian workers, poverty has increased 
while the state remains a passive spectator to this episode. The many company closures 
and the attendant retrenchments have exacerbated unemployment and poverty. Trade 
unions have failed to curb the infringement on workers’ rights by investors because of the 
special status and concessions accorded to them by the state. On the other hand, trade 
unions and the ministry of labour officials do not sit on the board of the Zambia 
Investment Centre (ZIC) which negotiates with investors to ascertain their suitability to 
set up business in the country. This makes it difficult to monitor abuses.   
 
As a response to calls for the expansion of the industrial base in Zambia, government last 
year formulated the Commercial, Trade and Industrial Policy (CTI) which spells out a 
long term vision for the industrial sector, domestic trading activities and Zambia’s 
participation in international trade arrangements. According to the country’s Ministry of 
Commerce Permanent Secretary Davidson Chilipamushi, the concept reflects on the 
progress and challenges of the last decade and focuses on government’s future support to 
the private sector.9 Through this policy, government hopes to transform and diversify the 
economy to make it more competitive and enable it effectively integrate into the global 
economy. It is expected that this will stimulate inflows of foreign investment and 
eventually boost exports.  
 
The non-compliance by many investors to the country’s labour laws and fair labour 
practices, has contributed to weakening the process of collective bargaining particularly 
with union and other worker representatives. Threats of closure and relocation have also 
been effective in toning down any acts of agitation from both the unions and the workers. 
Faced with the high levels of unemployment in the country, most workers apply the ‘half 
a loaf of bread is better than none’ principle and are willing to accept work under 
unacceptable conditions than being unemployed. The religious commitment by the state 
to the market policy and privatisation has, as Ferguson, 1999) argues, shattered 
expectations of modernisation. This is also supported by the view of Stiglitz (2001), 
                                                 
9 Author interview with Davidson Chilipamushi on 24 January 2006 in Lusaka Zambia 
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when he speaks of liberalism and privatisation being objectives of reform which pushed 
the lives of individuals into poverty, loss of employment and feeling of powerlessness. 
 
Social Dialogue 
Zambia has a tripartite structure for social dialogue, embracing employers, labour and 
government. The Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC) serves as an advisory 
body to government on issues of labour and related matters. Although the Zambian 
labour market has undergone turbulent times since the liberalization policies, the tripartite 
structure has provided a useful platform for resolving some sticky labour issues. Fashoyin 
(2002:2) writes, “the Tripartite Consultative Labour Council (TCLC) is without doubt the 
most significant national institution through which the tripartite partners participate in 
policy formulation and implementation of economic and social policy in Zambia today”. 
The council debates issues referred to it by the government as well as those initiated by 
the social partners themselves.  
 
Currently, the TCLC is reviewing the 1993 Industrial and Labour Relations Act to enable 
it deal with issues that have emerged on the labour market during the period of 
globalisation. However, the TCLC has been heavily criticised for failing to effect changes 
agreed upon in its meetings, especially those for which government is not comfortable 
with. One weakness of the TCLC is that its decisions are not legally binding and some of 
its recommendations are merely ignored by government. Unions have raised their voices 
over delays in revising labour laws in the country, a process that that has been dragging 
since it started way back in 2002. 
It is interesting to note the different routes that have been taken by the different countries 
in terms of economic liberalisation. It is remarkable, for instance, to see the 
contradictions between the rate at which Zambia has opened up its economy while 
countries like Botswana have taken a more cautious approach with a slow rate of 
liberalisation. One explanation for this contrast, however, is that Zambia has for a long 
time been faced with a huge debt burden as compared to Botswana and this put the 
government of Zambia under pressure in acceding to measures imposed by the IMF and 
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World Bank. Since Botswana has been able to approach liberalism with caution, the 
country has, to a large extent, been able to restrain the exploitative tendencies and has 
kept in place the regulatory apparatuses of the state while in Zambia the shock therapy 
treatment has destroyed the social order upon which the self-regulating market rests 
(Burawoy, 2001). As Polanyi, cited by Burawoy (2001) argues, the commodification of 
land and labour comes to be hedged with restriction and protection and that when land 
and labour, including money are subject to open purchase and sale, they lose their 
essential nature. The state of labour in Zambia clearly supports Polanyi’s argument that 
when labour is hired and fired at will, it is dehumanised (Burawoy, 2001). 
While Botswana is just beginning to relax some of its social policies as is the case with 
the re-introduction of education fees, Zambia went for an all out liberalisation which has 
seen the privatisation of some essential services such as water. So in the case of Zambia, 
instead of a self-expanding market society hedged in and propelled by a vibrant society 
working together with a regulatory state, we have a society in retreat from the market and 
a state answering to the tune of global financial markets (Burawoy, 2001). According to 
Polanyi, cited by Burawoy (2001), the state is supposed to represent the ‘collective 
interests’, negotiating a balance between market and society, which the Zambian state has 
been unable to achieve.  
In trying to make sense of Zambia’s experience, one observes that the state’s attempt to 
catch up overnight with radical and dramatic plans led to the breaking up of the 
administrative system and re-concentrating power in the hands of the conglomerates 
(Burawoy, 2001). The working class in Zambia has, thus, developed what Burawoy 
(1999) calls its own allergy to market utopianism based on scepticism toward all 
ideologies that appeal to universal interests. Botswana, on the other hand, seems to 
exemplify an economy, as Burawoy (2001) suggests, where the state bureaucracy 
continues to direct the economy, coordinating private and public sectors and combining 
administered and market enterprises. I’m, therefore, compelled to go along with 
Burawoy’s suggestion that state socialism can supply the foundations of a thriving market 
economy, by incubating the state-society synergy that Polanyi took for granted 
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(Burawoy, 2001). Below is a summary of the findings the country case studies in the 
region. 
 Table 7:  Summary of Country findings on key issues 
 
Investment, 
Growth & 
Employment 
Social 
Economic Floor 
Labour 
Migration 
Labour Standards 
& Social 
Dialogue 
Decent Work and 
Global Production 
Chains 
Namibia 
Presence of 
foreign 
investment with 
low quality job 
created. FDIs 
have increased 
employment 
Social Welfare 
still being 
provided to 
citizens  
Exercises Strict 
migration laws 
in place to 
control influx of 
migrant labour 
Unions 
concerned by low 
labour standards 
in EPZs and FDI 
industries. Social 
dialogue 
structures in 
place but weak   
Textile industry and 
EPZs with poor 
working conditions 
for worker 
Swaziland 
Inflow of FDI in 
textile industry. 
Agro-based 
industries are 
the main source 
of employment.  
Social welfare 
slowly being 
reduced 
Migration 
labour to South 
Africa reducing 
due to reduction 
of mining 
activities in SA 
Unions 
concerned by low 
labour standards 
in the textile 
industries. Social 
dialogue 
structures in 
place but less 
effective 
Textile industry with 
poor working 
conditions and 
suppression of 
workers’ rights 
Zambia 
Investment in 
the retail, 
agricultural and 
mining sectors. 
Increase in 
casual and 
temporal 
employment 
State slowly 
increasing 
spending 
towards social 
services 
Migration of 
skilled labour 
and 
professionals 
mainly to South 
Africa, Europe 
and the US 
Strong social 
dialogue 
structures exist 
but more of 
advisory type. 
Low labour 
standards in 
multinationals 
Workers in foreign 
multinationals 
heavily exploited 
despite some level of 
unionisation 
Lesotho 
FDI in Textile 
industry. Private 
Sector 
employment has 
increased 
surpassing the 
public  sector 
State subsidises 
health and 
education 
services 
Migration to 
South Africa but 
has declined in 
recent years due 
to reduced 
mining 
activities in SA 
Low standards in 
FDI 
multinationals. 
Social dialogue 
structures exist 
but weak. 
However, labour 
standards  
Workers in the 
Textile industry face 
exploitation in terms 
of working 
conditions 
Botswana 
FDI in textile 
industry has 
pushed 
employment 
levels up. Also 
growth of the 
private sector. 
Has high social 
spending but 
lately has lately 
introduced cost-
sharing 
education fees 
High presence 
of unskilled, 
skilled and 
professional 
migrant labour 
from 
neighbouring 
countries  
Social dialogue 
structures being 
developed. 
Workers in the 
textile industry not 
unionised and open 
to abuse by 
employers 
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4.5 Can the region use globalisation to its advantage? 
While it is generally accepted that globalisation is an irreversible process, it is important 
that its implications, in many respects, are seriously dissected to determine whether 
everyone is benefiting from the process. Clearly, it is evident from this study that 
developing countries, particularly those in Africa have not derived full benefits of 
globalisation. It is clear, however, that almost all the countries in the region have 
undertaken some form of economic restructuring, albeit at different levels. Given the 
poor infrastructural development and insufficient human capital in the region, countries 
have remained sources of raw material extraction for the industrialised countries. The 
economic profile of the region, in terms of investment and employment creation, has a 
mixed interpretation due to unbalanced growth between the developed and developing 
countries. As noted by Webster and Bezuidenhout (2005), some of the countries in the 
region are still recovering from the legacies of colonialism and wars which left them in a 
state of disrepair.  
It is also clear that dominant forces in the global order have set their interests in the world 
outside their own home countries. Understanding these changes is, therefore, critical in 
redefining policy options, including economic and social policies as well as the role of 
the state. The economic interests of these dominant forces include the search for broader 
and far reaching breakdown of the free movement of goods, capital and people and 
elimination of obstacles to setting up of business or production processes anywhere in the 
world. The next chapter focuses on Zambia as a case study and provides an in-depth 
analysis of the research findings.  
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Chapter Five:   
Zambia  
5.0 Background to Reforms  
Zambia’s economic performance in the last forty years has been characterized by three 
distinct phases. The first phase refers to the period the country enjoyed a buoyant 
economy just after independence in 1964 owing to high copper prices. The second phase 
covers the period between the late 1970s to end of the 1980s when the economy took a 
plunge and, lastly, the third phase where the country introduced neo-liberal policies with 
a view to reversing deteriorating economic conditions. Through these policies and 
nationalisation, the government put almost 80 per cent of the national economy under its 
control. In other words, Zambia pursued a state-led economic developmental path.  
 
The Zambian government’s interventionist approach in economic management was also 
seen as a way of correcting the huge inequalities in income distribution between Africans 
and non-Africans and the surplus the country enjoyed from copper earnings appeared to 
provide a solution to this intention.  However, the nationalization programme and the 
country’s ambitious programme of substituting imports proved a costly decision for 
government as the country was unable to diversify the economy from copper production 
(Osei-Hwedie, 2003). Zambia, therefore, represents a classic example of the downside of 
a state-led approach to development. 
 
Although Zambia is well endowed with natural resources, available data shows that the 
majority of the country’s population lives in poverty. The government’s budget on social 
services expenditure has drastically reduced over the years and due to the massive 
retrenchments and redundancies effected under liberalisation policies, there has been 
increased poverty with current estimates showing that 80 per cent of the population are 
living under poverty.  
  
In the mid-1970s, the country began to experience economic decline following the 
collapse of the copper prices and the global oil crisis (Bisten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
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2000; Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). The poor performance of the economy had severe 
consequences on the entire economy while the government was unwilling to adjust. The 
government instead took to heavy foreign borrowing in order to minimize the impact on 
the declining living standards of the people. The government tried to deal with the crisis 
by increasing regulations, such as tightening regulations on consumer prices and 
expanding subsidies on basic commodities (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). The 
failure by the government to implement reform following the sharp drop in copper prices 
in preference to financing the crisis had set the stage for the country’s economic disaster. 
This, combined with the general absence of accountability, perpetuated the country’s 
large budget deficits for so long and the reduction in the economy’s capacity to create 
wealth (McPherson, 1995). It is useful to mention that at this time Kaunda and his ruling 
party - UNIP - had declared a one party rule in Zambia.  This in effect personalized 
Kaunda’s rule which only contributed to the erosion of accountable governance.  
 
Faced with a situation where the government was caught ‘between the devil and the deep 
blue sea’, and in the midst of increasing poverty, the government had no alternative but to 
enter into collaborative arrangements with the IMF. McPherson argues that “the 
government responded with several attempts a reform. Internationally-supported 
programmes were undertaken in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1989 and 1991 through 
the different reform programmes. None was continued to the point where economic 
reform could have succeeded” (1995:9). As the process of economic degeneration took 
its toll on the Zambian society, government efforts to implement reform packages were 
met with stiff domestic opposition, especially from miners on the Copperbelt. There was 
also firm resistance to the reform measure from the trade union movement, which 
signalled souring relations between the labour movement and the UNIP government. But 
as Rakner explains, the government remained unshaken by any resistance to the reforms, 
“outlawing and suppressing strike action in all essential areas” (2003: 59). But the turning 
point to the UNIP government came in December 1986 when the government announced 
the decontrol of maize prices. This move unleashed a wave of unrest never witnessed in 
Zambia since independence, leaving 15 people dead (Rakner, 2003). According to 
Rakner, this led to government suspending its relationship with the IMF in 1987 and 
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instead opted for a home-grown economic recovery programme called the New 
Economic Recover programme (NERP). According to Situmbeko and Zulu (2004), the 
decision to implement a home grown policy programme led to a reduction in inflation 
levels and the economy recorded some growth.  
 
Zambia’s decision to cut ties with the IMF was received by disapproval from the donor 
community, particularly those under the Paris Club, who started tightening the noose on 
Zambia for going against the set conditions that required a country to maintain a 
programme with the IMF in order to qualify for assistance. This dilemma sent the 
Zambian government back to the IMF and World Bank in 1989 where it was further 
insisted that the country could only come out of its economic quagmire by taking 
stringent fiscal measures, painful as they were, if it were to receive any assistance from 
the IMF. The country’s economic problems continued up until the 1991, when the 
volatile political and economic conditions led to a change of government ushering in the 
MMD government.  
 
5.1 The 1991 economic reforms: Shock therapy 
When the MMD took office in 1991, the country’s economic position was far worse off 
than it was at independence. Basic social services such as provision of health and 
education were appalling. Hospitals had no drugs, beds and staff while schools faced a 
serious shortage of staff, desks and books (Rakner, et al, 1999). The MMD made it clear 
to the people that the government would have to effect austerity measures in order to get 
the economy back on track. With people willing to sacrifice over what was then 
perceived as a short-term austerity (Rakner et al, 1999), the MMD set out in 
implementing a variety of economic reforms that were to spell doom for the ordinary 
Zambian. Essentially, the government hoped to implement policies that would help 
transform the country’s weak economy into a strong and sustainable one and to link it to 
the global economy.  
 
Essentially, the Chiluba government implemented reforms far much more rapidly than 
did the Kaunda government, in fact more than any other Africa government (Osei-
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Hwedie, 2001). Thus, Zambia, writes Osei-Hwedie, was seen by the international donor 
community as a model liberalizing economy, which earned the country an opportunity to 
borrow heavily in order to pay off outstanding debts and to finance development. The 
reforms implemented are documented in greater detail in other studies, but suffice to say 
that the reforms did not yield the expected results Zambians had sacrificed for. For 
instance inflation remained high at over 100 per cent in 1993 and the number of people 
living in poverty increased to 73 per cent by 1996(Bryne, 1994; Osei-Hwedie, 2001). As 
Bryne(1994) argues, the new government became more popular with the donors than it 
was domestically 
 
In addition, based on its election campaign manifesto, the MMD government had laid out 
a clear indication of returning the economy to the market and the private sector and in 
1992 the privatization programme of state enterprises was formally launched. This 
followed the enactment of the Privatisation Act No. 21 and the creation of the Zambia 
Privatisation Agency (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). Although getting off to a slow start 
initially, the privatization programme gained momentum and by the end of 2001, a total 
of 257 state companies had been sold off to private hands (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). 
However, strong opposition by social movements and other political parties delayed the 
sale of the mining conglomerate – the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines – ZCCM. This 
according to McCulloch et al (2000) led to donor withholding balance of payments for 
three years until in 2000 when the government accepted a bid by Anglo-American Co-
operation.   
 
As pointed out earlier, the government directed most of the national income towards debt 
servicing than socio-economic development and this eroded public confidence in the 
government and the level of disappointment and disillusionment among the people was 
clearly apparent.  McPherson (1995) argues that while the economic programme of the 
MMD was full of promise in terms of maintaining fiscal stability, the new government 
seemed to face problems with implementation.  The reforms were expected to bring about 
fiscal stability but instead the macro-economic situation continued to deteriorate. 
McPherson puts it succinctly when he writes, “the new government had blown it. It had 
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failed to do the one thing that mattered most: it had not distinguished its approach to 
economic management from that of its predecessor” (1995:11).  
 
However,  it is also important to state that while the implementation of economic reforms 
in Zambia had its own flaws, it is necessary to recognize the role played by the 
international financial institutions (IMF and the World Bank) in exacerbating social and 
economic problems in the country. Situmbeko and Zulu (2004), argue that the conditions 
that the IFIs attached to the loans and debt relief had a telling effect on the overall 
management of the national economy. They hold that if the overriding argument for 
conditions to be attached to debt relief is to ensure that recipient countries do not slip into 
further debt, then such a policy did not work for Zambia. The twenty-plus years 
relationship Zambia has had with the IFIs is a long period for country to completely turn 
around the economic downturn but this has not been the case. It is also argued that the 
IFIs policies were failing to deliver because they lacked democratic scrutiny. This ties in 
well with Stiglitz’s (2002) argument that the current problem is that global institutions 
reflect the mind-sets of those to whom they are accountable. Stiglitz is of the view that 
the process of providing assistance to needy countries is not implemented in tandem with 
the needs of individual countries and has more often than not been rushed in terms of 
implementation, using wrong and inadequate policies or analysis. Clearly, it can be noted 
that the implementation of economic reforms did not produce the expected results.  
 
As can be seen, the implementation of the economic reforms has produced a mix of 
results and has impacted differently across various sectors of the country’s economy and 
society. It has been shown from available evidence that while the reforms have opened up 
new opportunities in some areas, there have also been a number of sections of society 
which have been affected negatively by the reforms. One such area is employment. As 
argued earlier, the government, through the privatization programme, had sold off more 
than 250 state firms to the private sector by 2001. The impact of this sale of state 
enterprises to the private sector has been significantly profound. Given that this research 
focuses on the impact of restructuring on workers in Zambia, I now wish to explore the 
issue of privatization and how it has affected jobs in Zambia, in greater detail. 
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5.2 Impact of Privatisation on the Zambian Labour Market  
Privatisation can simply be described as the process by which governments sell off their 
enterprises to private investors, local or foreign. Countries privatize in order to reduce the 
scope of government in cases where government operations have gotten so big and are 
consuming too much in terms of resources (USINFO, 2006). Privatisation, then, allows 
the private sector to buy off such entities from the state with a view to running them more 
efficiently and enable them function as the engine of economic growth. According to 
USINFO (2006), in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, the collapse of 
socialism has prompted fundamental transitions toward market economies based on 
private property and private sector development. Literature on economic restructuring 
reveals that there is a strong link between economic reform and privatization and that 
embarking on privatization is a sign of a government’s commitment to economic reform.  
 
The privatization of state enterprises, was thus, a strong feature of the MMD’s economic 
reform and this entailed the retrenchment of at least 10 000 civil servants. Although 
Zambia has been praised by the IFIs as having implemented “the most successful 
privatization programme in Sub-Saharan Africa”, such praise has failed to take account 
of the devastating effects of the process on the domestic economy and the labour force in 
particular. As Rakner (2003) writes, by 1994 the effects of privatization in an economy in 
crisis were beginning to be felt following the closure of many companies and down-
scaling of operations. The uncertainty of the future of workers who were being retrenched 
from their jobs drew sharp criticisms from the labour movement and other social 
movements who implored the government to take a more cautious approach to 
privatization. A survey report by Zambia’s Ministry of Labour and Social Security on 
“Current Practices in Labour Market Information systems in Zambia” produced in 2000 
supports the position that jobs are usually lost in the process of privatization. Almost all 
of the companies privatized under Zambia’ reform programme, the report notes, have 
reduced their employment levels. Further more, the report points out that as employment 
in the formal sector has declined in absolute terms, the quality of employment in the 
formal sector has also declined. 
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However, the proposed restructuring of the public service hit a snag when it was 
discovered by government that the social cost of retrenching civil servants was “too high” 
to make it a viable reform option (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2000). The purpose of 
effecting retrenchments in the public service was to make it more efficient by 
maintaining a reduced, well remunerated and highly motivated workforce. Bigsten and 
Kayizzi (2000) argue that a bloated civil service remains a serious growth constraint and 
that the administrative capacity has also deteriorated further due to the heavy toll of 
HIV/AIDS. Thus, privatization has raised mixed opinions about the benefits of the 
programme. While most Zambians were optimistic that privatization would improve their 
livelihood given the principle of ‘efficiency’ attached to private enterprises, it is clear 
from available statistics that thousands of jobs were lost due to retrenchments effected 
when privatization occurred. It is estimated that employment in the manufacturing sector 
fell from 75 400 in 1991 to 43 320 in 1998 while in the textile industry employment fell 
from 34 000 in the early 1990s to only 4 000 in 2001 (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004). 
 
Poverty has been on the upswing due to failure by people to secure jobs in the formal 
sector. This perhaps could point to arguments that jobs created under privatization are far 
less than those lost. As argued by Situmbeko and Zulu (2004), job losses suffered in the 
process of retrenchments and redundancies by private companies have not been offset by 
the new private sector employment. Similarly, Stiglitz (2002) has argued that that the 
impact on employment has, perhaps, been both the major argument for and against 
privatization, noting that privatization did not create as many jobs as it destroyed. Further 
more Stiglitz explains that workers who lose their jobs tend to endure social 
consequences of unemployment long past the immediate loss of a job. Given the 
minimalist role of the state in a market economy, workers affected by job losses 
following privatization are subjected to immeserisation and poverty as they are deprived 
of their only means of reproducing themselves in the formal sector.  
 
Whereas, Burawoy (1999) talks of the state administering the external conditions of the 
market and protecting society against the market, the state in Zambia did little to protect 
labour from the invading free market. In this case, therefore, the state becomes not the 
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vehicle of social protection but what Burawoy (1999) termed “an instrument of market 
fundamentalism…, far from protecting labour, the state watches impassively as jobs 
disappear and real wages plummet, waiting  for the economic upsurge that never comes”. 
The failure by the government to create opportunities for those being retrenched or 
declared redundant to be reabsorbed into formal employment was a clear testimony of 
government’s inability to deal with the crisis at hand. Perhaps this is the distinction 
Marnie (1992) was making by stating that while African countries closed state enterprises 
without planning for the future of the affected workers, Russia considered the inclusion 
of a new Employment Act in its economic reform, to set out a provision for the 
anticipated large increases in unemployment.  The table below shows the trend of 
employment in Zambia from 1985 to 2005. 
 
Table 8:   Formal sector employment trends by industry, Zambia 1985 - 2005 
Source: CSO, Lusaka, Zambia 
 
As can noted from the statistics in the table above, there was a massive drop in formal 
sector employment from a total of 521 900 in 1985 to 436 066 in 2005. Almost all sectors 
registered a decline in employment, except for the personal and community service sector 
   Business Personal & 
Elect.  & Financial Community Year Agricultural Mining. Manufac-turing  & 
Water 
Constru-
ction Trade Transport 
Services Services 
Total 
2005 65,496 32,103 40,151 6,309 7,953 67,251 20,679 22,313 173,990 436,066
2004 65,136 46,078 45,340 12,346 5,787 44,460 26,510 31,880 138,691 416,228
2003 64,096 48,597 39,385 10,832 3,467 53,450 26,725 28,555 141,697 416,804
2002 43,819 37,245 67,752 7,316 2,406 50,812 21,566 52,727 145,763 429,406
2001 59,248 34,966 47,679 5,038 13,798 52,223 46,618 31,415 184,331 475,316
2000 59,377 35,042 47,782 5,049 13,828 52,336 46,719 31,483 184,731 476,347
1999 60,000 38,521 46,000 5,300 12,895 51,097 45,000 34,682 184,008 477,508
1998 58,630 39,160 46,685 5,237 13,459 48,964 45,840 35,276 173,674 466,925
1997 58,898 42,498 47,118 5,009 17,106 48,893 45,963 37,862 169,814 475,161
1996 68,300 47,700 47,400 4,400 13,100 46,800 38,300 37,600 175,800 479,400
1995 69,079 52,215 55,654 5,067 10,518 41,398 36,542 41,890 172,604 485,000
1994 78,300 51,200 57,100 5,100 17,500 49,900 29,000 34,100 173,800 496,000
1993 82,800 58,200 67,600 5,700 22,100 49,300 29,000 37,000 168,300 520,000
1992 82,000 62,100 73,600 8,400 27,800 51,300 31,100 39,000 170,700 545,900
1991 77,800 64,800 75,400 7,600 33,100 53,200 34,300 35,800 162,200 544,200
1990 79,800 64,700 77,100 7,100 33,400 55,100 33,800 32,900 159,400 543,300
1989 81,900 64,600 75,200 7,100 35,200 54,300 33,300 32,200 156,700 540,500
1988 80,600 64,600 74,500 6,600 37,300 51,000 32,800 31,500 154,500 533,400
1987 78,500 64,600 74,400 6,600 39,600 49,700 32,300 32,500 152,100 530,000
1986 77,200 64,500 75,600 6,500 40,900 47,800 32,400 32,500 179,100 526,500
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where the figure recorded an increase. Although Zambia’s labour force is estimated to 
have grown from around 3.2 million in 1991 to over 4.7 million in 1998, the formal 
sector only employed 17 per cent of the labour force in 1991 and despite the 46 per cent 
increase in the labour force, formal sector employment declined by at least 15 per cent 
indicating less than 10 per cent of employment (McCulloch et al, 2000).  This is clearly 
illustrative of the fact that the reduction in formal sector employment is exclusively due 
to job losses in former state enterprises that had gone to private hands.  
 
As McCulloch et al (2000) note, until 1996, job losses in state enterprises sector were not 
compensated by corresponding increases in private sector employment and as a result, 
large numbers of most the retrenchees were shunted into the informal sector. Due to the 
difficulty in defining the informal sector, it is almost impossible to give a precise number 
of jobs the informal sector provides in Zambia. As McCulloch et al (2000) assert, since 
the definition of the informal sector may include unpaid work it becomes difficult to 
determine the extent to which the increase in informal sector employment represents a 
genuine increase in opportunities rather than a reclassification of workers displaced from 
formal sector activities.  
 
What is remarkable about privatization in Zambia is that the process has been extended to 
the privatization of essential services. Essential basic social services such as water and 
transport have been privatized, raising serious concern among consumers due to 
increased tariffs. There has been increased pressure from social movements against the 
privatization of the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and the Zambia 
National Commercial Bank (Zanaco). The labour movement, in particular, which has 
been opposed to he manner privatization has been implemented in Zambia, has strongly 
opposed the privatization of the two (ZESCO and Zanaco) because of the potential job 
losses this may lead to. The labour movement organised public protests against the 
privatisation of ZANACO and other utilities in 2004, arguing that this would deny the poor 
(especially those in rural areas) access to the services provided by these companies. 
Government paid attention to the protests and assured the public that it will not go ahead 
with the process, but it later succumbed to pressure from the World Bank and IMF who had 
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already set continued privatisation as a condition for further support and debt relief to 
Zambia (ZCTU Report, 2006) 
 
The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions argues that in the previous cases of privatisation, 
“liquidators of the state owned enterprises earned great fortunes because of seemingly 
lack of seriousness on the part of Government authorities. This state of affairs has been a 
source of concern to the Congress for the reason that the nation does not get any 
information with regard to the status of funds realised upon sale of assets” (ZCTU 
Reports, 2006). ZCTU feels that those tasked to liquidate former state enterprises do not 
show records of rentable values of properties held by them and/or under their custody for 
the liquidated companies to the extent that they have endlessly continued to hold on to 
the state assets and properties while no steps are taken by government to control the 
situation. Joyce Nonde, President of the Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia 
(FFTUZ) states the argument more explicitly when she points out that, “while the labour 
movement generally welcomes the principle of privatisation, it did this with the 
understanding that the workers’ interests  would be protected by  government and the 
new investors” (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004: 22). 
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Table 9: Labour Force in the Mining Sector for both Management and unionized workers 
1987 -1998 
DIVISION 1987/8
8 
1988/8
9 
1989/90 1990/9
1 
1991/9
2 
1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/9
6 
1996/9
7 
1997
/98 
Nchanga 14 864 15 270 15 896 10 590 11 102 10 157 9 960 9 469 8 819 8 817 8 710 
Mufulira 8 616 9 146 8 532 8 320 9 068 7 978 7 953 7 175 6 558 6 412 8 086 
Nkana 14 652 14 772 14 127 13 631 14 687 13 818 13 204 11 680 11 414 11 082 9 518 
Luanshya 8 701 8 945 8 557 8732 9 621 8 526 8 219 7 292 6 813 6 576 0 
Konkola 0 0 0 5 667 6 054 5 793 5 984 5 532 5 029 4 877 4 698 
Chibuluma 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kabwe 2 295 2 412 2 289 2 202 2 249 2 067 1 943 375 201 154 108 
Nampund-
we 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 456 393 0397 385 
NCR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Power 
Division 
525 535 959 986 1080 929 922 909 914 883 0 
OPC/CSD 3 732 3 727 4 321 4 712 2 224 2 182 2 293 1 729 1 637 1 573 1 327 
CHO 214 266 286 337 497 426 423 407 303 259 201 
TOTAL 53 542 55 073 54 967 55 177 56 582 51 976 50 901 45 024 42 081 41 030  31 
033 
Source:  Mineworkers of Zambia 
 
These statistics for the mining sector clearly show that employment in the sector dropped 
from 1991 when privatisation was embarked on and the labour force continued to fall up 
to 1998. There were retrenchments following downsizing exercises as well as total 
closure of some of the mines. By the end of December 1999, there were 8 329 miners 
who had been retrenched or declared redundant, following the final sale of ZCCM 
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(Kangwa, 2001). On the whole, assuming that each retrenched miner was responsible for 
the livelihoods of at least five other family members, this meant more than 41 000 people 
affected by the redundancies.  
 
The absence of viable non-mining sectors to absorb the former miners forced the 
retrenches to turn to agriculture.  According to the Mineworkers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ), most workers had anticipated better lives after the recapitalisation of the mines. 
MUZ Director of Research and Education, Charles Muchimba10, explained that despite 
initial fears due to uncertainties over the future of the mines, the miners expected that the 
new mine owners would offer better jobs with better services and conditions.  But despite 
nominal increases in salaries due to higher copper prices, Muchimba asserts that there has 
been a general decline in the general conditions of work and benefits. Muchimba notes 
that before privatisation, miners enjoyed better fringe benefits though their levels of pay 
were lower than the current ones. Miners have received nominal salary increases 
following increased production and higher copper prices on the world market. Whereas 
the cost of electricity, water and sewerage were subsidised by the company, the new 
owners had introduced cost sharing measures. Muchimba also criticised the shift in the 
miners’ pension scheme: 
 
“Before privatisation, the nature of the scheme – Mukuba Pension 
Scheme – was favourable such that miners enjoyed benefits after 
retirement for the rest of their lives. But after privatisation, the new 
mine owners introduced a pension scheme which is contribution 
defined and is treated more as a severance package. It terminates 
upon leaving employment”. 
Although the mines have been recapitalised, there has been a rapid decline in 
employment levels due to automation which has led to most production points being 
highly automated and computerised. This has, obviously, resulted in an increase in casual 
labour as well as insecurity among our members. Thus, explains Muchimba: 
 
                                                 
10 Author interview with Charles Muchimba, 27 August 2006 
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“Privatisation has brought with it multi-skilling and multi-tasking 
among the workers. Workers are being trained to handle more tasks 
than they used to in the past. In certain mining companies, there has 
also been an increase in the hours of work for some categories from an 
8hour shift a week to 12hours for an intensive two weeks and then they 
are allowed a week long time off. Casual and temporary employment 
has also increased with such workers being employed either directly by 
the mining company or through sub-contractors. This has reduced the 
number of unionised employees although we are now trying to organise 
such workers as well. Casualisation has increased insecurity among 
miners, especially that employers have sharpened disciplinary codes and 
are meting out stricter penalties than was the case in the past”.  
 
Clearly, there has been a sense of disillusionment among the miners. Ferguson refers to 
this as going through a process of “decline, abjection and disconnection” (1999: 236). 
Beyond simply illustrating the downside of privatisation, the story of the Zambian miners 
reveals something more fundamental about the global economic system and the 
inequality it breeds. Muchimba perhaps amplifies this point when he states that, “the 
work environment now is that of falling standards with a high intensity and sharpened 
relationship between employers and employees. While the miners in the past fought 
colonial powers, now they are fighting a different battle which has international 
dimensions in the name of globalised corporate power”. 
 
Although Zambia approached the issue of privatising the mining sector with caution, few 
anticipated that even middle aged workers, who were still miles away from retirement, 
would be affected. According to Lesa Kanyanta11, President of the Association for the 
Welfare of Former Miners in Zambia (AWFMZ), because of declining productivity on 
the mines, workers in the sector looked forward to an injection of capital in order to 
revitalise the operations of the mines. Thus, comments Kanyanta, “when I heard that the 
mines were to be privatised, I was very expectant because I was aware that the mines 
                                                 
11 Author interview with Lesa Kanynta on 23 August 2006  
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needed to be recapitalised. But I was shocked when I realised that even young men like 
me had to go”.  None of the young miners were prepared for this sort of shock and their 
early departure from employment spelt doom for most of them. “Up to now, most former 
miners are still living in poverty, especially that most of them have even been forced to 
sell their houses which they bought as part of the retrenchment package,” asserted 
Kanyanta who leads a 4, 800-strong member organisation.  
 
It was difficult for the former miners to get employment in other sectors because most of 
the sectors had already collapsed. Kanyanta blamed government for the predicament 
facing former miners, “because the government did not have any plan to support 
retrenches. There was a vacuum and people were simply left in the cold. This was a 
disaster for the people”.  The feelings of people affected by privatisation obviously 
suggest that although privatisation was earlier seen as a panacea to the declining 
economy, it later turned out that workers could no longer support the programme because 
of the suffering they went through. There was a high sense of betrayal among Zambians 
over the outcomes of privatisation and it was strongly felt that the government was 
surrendering the country into foreign hands with little regard to the welfare of Zambians. 
The continued suffering among those affected by the consequences suggests that 
government did not give much thought to the plight of those to be displaced by 
privatisation. As Kanyanta laments, “even today, government has no programme for 
retrenchees, just as it has no programme for those of our young people leaving tertiary 
education in search of jobs”. Kanyanta feels that the widespread rejection of the MMD 
government by voters on the Copperbelt and Lusaka province in the September, 2006 
Parliamentary and Presidential elections, clearly demonstrated the resentment of people 
over the economic policies the government was pursuing.  
 
In the context of severe contraction in formal formal sector employment and increased 
poverty levels, the sentiments by AWFMZ are indicative of how inappropriate 
implementation of economic policies can lead to disastrous consequences. The AWFMZ 
see the deprivation privatisation has imposed on Zambians, who once occupied decent 
jobs, as a recolonisation of African economies. As Kanyanta notes, “these neo-liberal 
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policies have merely re-introduced colonisation of our industries. The country is being 
reaped of its resources without much benefit to the local population. People in this 
association (AWFMZ) bear the real picture of those who have been bruised by 
privatisation and are still experiencing hardships”.   
 
According to Situmbeko and Zulu (2004:21) the benefits of privatisation have not 
accrued to Zambians as anticipated and it is strongly felt that privatisation has only 
served to enrich foreign investors at the expense of the ordinary workers and Zambians in 
general. This view is also espoused by Burawoy (1999), when he argues that the state in a 
market economy tends to protect a narrow class of oligarchs who own and control the 
most profitable industries and control the major banks and media channels. In this sense, 
it seems privatisation can only succeed under reforms that create more open and 
competitive markets. Given the social disorders associated with privatisation, particularly 
in the short term where declining production or rising unemployment are clearly visible, 
the process is more likely to be a source of political discontent. It, then, becomes 
imperative for government to pay attention and cultivate support among the population 
for privatisation and economic reform in general (USINFO, 2006). The danger in failure 
to achieve this was that even for reform programmes that are well designed technically 
can fail politically if they lack public support. 
 
It is also relevant to bring to the fore the point that although the labour movement did 
question the wisdom of implementing a privatisation programme that was to inflict so 
much pain on the workers, the unions were equally concerned by the effect privatisation 
was having on the membership figures. Most of the workers who were losing jobs 
through privatisation were union membership and therefore their departure meant loss of 
membership for the unions. Before privatisation, the ZCTU was boasting of over 400 000 
members, but this figure has drastically fallen to levels below 250 000. Another factor 
which has been problematic to efforts by unions to increase membership has been the 
hostility by the emerging private sector employers towards unionisation. Most of the new 
investors are reluctant to recognise the presence of unions at their workplaces and in 
many instances workers who show any interest in union activities are intimidated and 
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threatened by dismissals. The investors are demanding more and more flexibility in 
labour laws under which practices of part-time work, temporal employment, casualisation 
all flourish in the quest by employers to reduce costs. 
 
The question, therefore, that arises is how practical is it for countries like Zambia to 
achieve sustainable economic growth if there isn’t sufficient attention paid to basic and 
needy areas within its society. I think conventional economic wisdom demands that 
development should be about improving people’s livelihoods and it is necessary, 
therefore, that a sustainable growth path should not neglect or compromise the needs of 
the population. The decline in jobs in Zambia shows that privatisation has not been 
implemented in a manner that can bring about positive results. Instead of the expected 
efficiency and profitability (Williamson: 2004), privatisation has instead led to 
widespread poverty, inequality and job losses (Stiglitz, 2002, Burawoy, 2001, Webster 
and Bezuidenhout, 2003). 
 
5.3 Case Study: The Privatisation of Nkana Water and Sewerage Company 
 
The privatisation of water services in Zambia provides a classic case of reduced state 
intervention and diminishing power of labour. Before the introduction of privatisation in 
Zambia, the provision of water services was a responsibility of municipality authorities in 
the various cities and towns. In the mining towns, water and sewerage services were 
mainly provided by the mining companies themselves. In 1999, Nkana Water and 
Sewerage Company was incorporated to provide water and sewerage services to five 
towns on the Copperbelt namely; Kitwe, Luanshya, Mufulira, Kalulushi and Chingola. In 
2006, the company was directed to take over of the assets of Asset Holding Company 
(AHC) which was a mining municipal service wing. AHC was operating in all major 
mining townships.  Following the signing of a Statutory Instrument in 1997, the 
government passed a law which effectively de-linked water and sewerage service 
departments from local authorities throughout the country to transform them into private 
companies with 100 per cent shareholding in the companies. Essentially, the main thrust 
of reform has been the creation of commercial water utilities in many parts of the 
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country. As part of this process, the Nkana Water and Sewerage Company subsequently 
took over the responsibilities of Asset Holding Company in some mining towns. 
 
The taking over of AHC by Nkana Water and Sewerage Company meant that the 
company assumes responsibility of providing water and sewerage to both mining and 
non-mining areas in the towns where the company operates. The company has five semi-
autonomous Divisions operating in different towns of the Copperbelt. The company 
employs about 693 workers, of whom 585 are unionized employees.  While displacement 
of labour is a strong feature of privatization, being an essential service provider, the 
company did not effect massive lay-offs following the take-over, except for a few who 
were said to be unskilled. According to the company’s Human Resources Manager 
Pitsane Mapate, it was “prudent to lay off these workers because they were unskilled but 
we took on at least 90 per cent of the labour force”.  While the company is still 
expanding, Mapate explains that management is reluctant to employ more workers and 
was instead trying to downsize from the current workforce, an indication that the 
company wanted to maintain a minimum number of workers to avoid costs.   
 
Although the story from management presents a rosy picture of the company, the 
downside of working under a privately owned company was revealed in discussions with 
the union leadership. Workers in this company are organized by the Zambia Water 
Sanitation, Engineering and Allied Workers Union. The union’s General Secretary 
Agrippah Phiri12 lists a number of problems the union and the workers have faced with 
management:   
                                                                                                                                                                             
“Firstly, we have the problem of classification, where even crafts 
certificate holders are placed under management ranks just to silence 
them. There is no clear definition as to who belongs to management and 
those who don’t. Secondly, under local authorities, we had very good 
conditions covering a number of benefits as compared to now.” 
 
                                                 
12  Author interview with Agrippah Phiri on 12 September 2006 
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In August 2006, the union called a nationwide strike to back demands for the payment by 
government, of retrenchment packages to workers who were formerly employed by local 
councils. The union’s President Benson Chipumbu said, “As you may be aware, most of 
our members were retrenched from the councils in 2000 but they have not been paid their 
retrenchment packages up to now. We thought we were breaking even on the matter 
when former Local Government Minister Andrew Mulenga promised three months ago 
that the employees would be paid their retrenchment packages soon” (The Post, August 
11, 2006). The non-payment of retrenchment packages did not affect those who 
previously worked for AHC. The failure by government to honour its promise to pay 
severance packages to the former council workers represents several other cases where 
workers in former state enterprises were left in the cold once their companies were sold 
off. Workers displayed their dissatisfaction through protests and demonstrations and 
court actions. 
 
In contrast to the workers’ expectations, most of them were de-motivated due to high 
levels of insecurity in the company. The union complained that there were instances 
when the company management withdrew certain benefits without negotiating with the 
union. Phiri lamented that the union had raised a number of issues concerning violation 
of conditions, but “because the company is profit driven, they always cite lack of funds as 
an excuse”. Phiri also revealed that workers were working under constant fear of losing 
jobs at the slightest mistake, emphasizing that while trade unionism appeared to be strong 
in the public sector, unions in the private sector were working under intimidation. This 
had led to union leaders compromising on union principles. These results suggest that the 
private sector has succeeded in repressing union power and although they have allowed 
the existence of unions at the workplace, these unions play a very marginal role. As 
Buhlungu (2000) asserts, unions and unionists are discovering that the agenda of trade 
unionism in the 1990s had changed dramatically and they are being forced to adapt to a 
new set of conditions and pressures. Admittedly, while internal union organization in 
most cases is weak, the lack of capacity by unions to exert their influence at the 
workplace has been due to the changes in the economic and political environment. It is, 
therefore clear that after so many years of being a major force, managements - 
  94
 
 
particularly in the private sector – have managed to take the initiative away from the 
unions, thus, forcing them to respond to new strategies (Buhlungu, 2000). 
 
The responses received from the workers in the company, whose real names have been 
withheld, show how the hard won gains by workers since independence have slowly 
slipped-through from the workers as privatization erodes their social and economic status. 
The research findings reveal that there is a growing sense of individualism among 
workers, where each worker sees himself or herself as an independent contractor 
responsible for their own social and economic risks of employment (Herod and Aguiar, 
2000). Most of the respondents pointed to a decline in the general conditions of their 
work. While most workers talked of an increase in monthly pay, they expressed concern 
at the fast-eroding industrial rights. Samson Chibuye, 45, married with five children and 
works as a driver, bemoaned the declining levels of job security among workers “because 
the union has not been as powerful as it used be in the past”. Chibuye believes that job 
security among workers will only increase if the union can be strengthened to the level of 
other unions “like the MUZ”, in an apparent reference to the powerful Mineworkers 
Union of Zambia. 
 
With a monthly income of about K1, 300, 000 (approx. US $300), Chibuye is unable to 
meet his basic monthly needs. Thus, said Chibuye:    
 
“I have no other means of income apart from my salary. When we 
were under a public institution (AHC), the company used to 
subsidise most of our social needs such as electricity, mealie meal, 
health and water but now we have to struggle on our own. With the 
high taxes we pay, I’m unable to meet family requirements. I fear 
that my children may not get sufficient education because I cannot 
meet the high school fees”. 
Such lamentations are unsurprising if one considers, for instance, that while in 
employment under the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), a miner and his or 
her family had automatic access to company provided medical and education facilities, 
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recreational activities sports amenities, electricity and water supply as well as sanitation 
services. Therefore, the consequent loss of these facilities and social services benefits 
under a privatised mining sector has had a negative impact on health, education and the 
general well-being of the mining communities. Nkana Water and Sanitation Company 
has been running public awareness campaigns to inform the residents in former mine 
townships concerning their responsibilities as consumers. The company stresses that it 
will have no alternative other than withdrawing services for consumers who do not pay. 
In an environment where many have no incomes, the possibility of serious health 
problems as a result of loss of services cannot be ruled out. The local authorities have 
also advanced their intentions to begin levying rates on the former mine houses as they 
are now eligible for rating (Kangwa, 2001). This view supports Leah Chiyeni, 46, a 
Customer Services Assistant, who expressed disappointment at the company’s failure to 
provide training opportunities to employees. Chiyeni complained that despite working 
hard for the company, employees had been told to sponsor themselves for further studies. 
She noted this was not possible due to low wages the workers received. 
 
Privatisation has also been criticized by workers on the basis that a privatised company 
lays less emphasis on worker welfare and demands from the worker than it gives. Stella 
Kaluba, 36, a customer service assistant, married with three children and has worked for 
the utility company for six years, feels the privatised company did not provide sufficient 
incentives as its predecessor did. Kaluba explained that the prospect of working under a 
private company raised workers’ expectations, such good working conditions and higher 
salaries, but after the change-over, things were different. She was dissatisfied with a 
number of things: 
 
“We are experiencing a different work culture, we work longer 
hours than what is paid for and it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to access social services. The union is not taking any measures to 
improve our job security and I’m generally not happy with the 
current social security scheme as compared to the previous one 
before the company was privatized”. 
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For workers of Nkana Water and Sewerage, therefore, privatization has meant having to 
put up with increased pressure of work, reduced benefits, growing job insecurity and 
taking on increased responsibilities without corresponding raises in benefits. Union 
representation which they had so much relied on in terms of protection has been 
weakened so much that it cannot save them from the worsening conditions. As Aguiar 
and Herod (2006) argue, neo-liberalism and privatization have entrenched economic and 
social exclusion among workers and eroded their ability to enjoy fully the rights which 
the welfare state extended. Aguiar and Herod, rather, express pessimism about the future 
under neo-liberalism when he stresses that, “the removal of government regulations will 
allow the market to operate as it should, without the distortions brought about by political 
interventions. The contemporary growth of low waged work and poor conditions which 
market deregulation is auguring is not actually an aberration but is, rather, emblematic of 
the nature of unfettered, “free market capitalism” (2006: 448). 
 
Although management of the water firm alluded to a reduction in strikes and other forms 
of industrial unrest, this does not illustrate improved industrial relations or satisfaction by 
workers over their conditions, but because workers in general suffer intimidation. As 43-
year-old Ali Mwaka, an artisan plumber who has been with the company for four years 
puts it, “yes strikes have reduced because we are threatened with dismissal whenever we 
think of taking any industrial action. While senior people (management) enjoy better 
conditions, the junior and middle level employees are given peanuts. We are intimidated 
and because of this, we accept whatever our union negotiates for us”.  Zebron Mwamba, 
a 34 year old artisan was critical of the wage disparities that currently existed among 
workers in the same category and regretted that appointments by management were “not 
being done in good faith”.  Mwamba said the union had tried hard to improve the welfare 
of its members under a “very hostile environment”. 
 
However, while the majority of the respondents appeared dissatisfied with their 
conditions of work, Moses Kaoma, 36, a father of three and working as a Zone supervisor 
sounded happy working under a private company. Kaoma confirmed that he was “quite 
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happy” with the conditions “because I’m able to sustain my family with the money I’m 
paid, although I do some informal business together with my wife”. He was happy with 
the new company because, “this time, I have reached supervisory level while previously I 
was static despite working for many years”. He was equally unhappy with representation 
from the union saying, “whatever the union has done for me, I’m not impressed. It has 
failed to fight for good conditions of service for us”. 
 
For Joseph Katongo, 49, and Lobina Shibalamuna, 38, life under a privatised company 
has been one of hopelessness and anxiety. Katongo, a plumber and father of seven, 
lamented over the reduced allowance towards funeral expenses. He complained that since 
moving from a public institution to a private company, workers were facing serious 
hardships in meeting costs for funerals of their loved ones. Katongo explains, “with the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic compounded by high levels of poverty, relatives are dying in large 
numbers and at the same time the company has reduced the amount of assistance workers 
can access towards funeral expenses. We are facing problems in meeting the costs of 
funerals of our relatives as the company only gives us a fixed amount of money and you 
are expected to meet the extra costs on your own whereas under the council we were 
provided with sufficient assistance in terms of funds and transport”. 
 
Shibalamuna, working in the data processing department and has been in employment the 
last 16 years, notes that while privatisation was ‘good’ the treatment the workers received 
from management amounted to exploitation “because we have very little say in issues 
that affect us in this company. In fact, we are disappointed because we were under the 
impression that since privatisation meant a reduction in the labour force, those that 
remained in employment would enjoy improved conditions of work but this has not been 
the case”. Shibalamuna notes, “there is total disregard of the provisions of the Industrial 
Relations Act by management and workers have nowhere to complain to because the 
union has been weakened while government seems to side with management”. She also 
revealed that there was misplacement of skills as some workers from over staffed 
departments were shifted to departments where their skills did not apply and they could 
not resist because they wanted to remain in employment. 
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The lack of protection among workers in a privatised company was a major concern for 
Pirate Musandu, 51, a maintenance supervisor who blamed government for the current 
problems in privatised companies because investors had been given so much power and 
leverage by the state without necessarily giving due regard to employees. Musandu 
complained that government was failing to enforce labour laws and this had greatly 
contributed to the vulnerability of the workers. Thus, argued Musandu, “workers in this 
company have very little protection because the labour laws are being abrogated with 
impunity by employers and the government takes no notice of complaints from workers 
because they fear investors can withdraw their capital and leave”. Musandu emphasised 
on the need for the trade unions to prevail over the suffering of their members and use the 
existing labour laws to protect their members. 
 
Musandu also expressed the concern that if government was failing to confront and deal 
with the problem of casualisation at this point, it would be difficult for government and 
unions to tackle the problem once it takes root in future. Investors would enjoy massive 
power over workers, Musandu explained, and it will become difficult to protect workers 
from exploitation. This was having a negative effect on the workers’ morale, as Musandu 
puts it “because all our anticipation and hopes of a bright future are being dashed by each 
new day that comes. Things are simply not falling into place at all”. 
 
However, George Mufumbwe, 33, blamed management’s “selfishness” as a major cause 
for the workers predicament in the company. Mufumbwe thinks that management was 
trying to act unfairly over workers by withdrawing most allowances which were 
previously enjoyed, in the name of cutting costs. He said privatisation of the water utility 
company could have benefited workers if only management had cared to share the profits 
equally. Mufumbwe, who has served for seven years in the administration department, 
claimed that the company was generating sufficient profits which could improve the 
welfare of workers if shared fairly. But, he argued, “we have a situation where 
management’s welfare is given preference over us the ordinary workers”. 
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One of the retrenched workers, Gibson Shakantu, 55, who formerly worked for the local 
authority as a plumber, spoke of how four of his seven children had to stop going to 
school because he could no longer afford the required costs. Shakantu had to sell the two- 
bedroom house he bought from the council while in employment, in order to raise income 
for his family’s survival. He argues’ “I just could not adjust to the new environment, 
especially that I left even without being given my terminal benefits immediately”.  
Shakantu said his children had to leave school and take up street vending as a way of 
raising family income. Although two of the children have continued with their education, 
he still remains pessimistic on how far they will go given the ever increasing high fees 
demanded at tertiary education level.  
 
Shakantu’s family which enjoyed high cost medical schemes while he was in employed 
were now forced to queue up at the low cost section at public hospitals which were 
poorly funded by government and where patients were often asked to buy their own 
drugs, except for emergency cases. Lamented Shakantu,“I do not see any future for my 
children. Education is the key but without a job, I have failed to provide for my children’s 
education because the fees are so high. I wished government could come up with special 
schemes for vulnerable children like mine”. Shakantu now survives by selling groceries 
at a makeshift stall at the end of a township street in Twatasha township, east of Kitwe.  
 
Notwithstanding the effect of privatization on the consumers due to increases in tariffs, it 
is clear from the above evidence that privatization has adverse effects on a broad range of 
services and benefits for worker. While economists may favour privatization for reasons 
of perceived efficiency, company growth and labour productivity, they tend to gloss over 
the direct effects on the economic and social welfare of workers. As argued earlier, 
privatisaion comes at a price to the workers when it comes to issues of lower levels of 
employment, longer working hours and worsening service conditions. It is clear, then, 
that the language of competitiveness and efficiency is undermining the workers’ ability to 
develop a sense of collective demands, collective identity or collective action (Seidman, 
2004: 118 - 119 in Aguiar, 2006). The problem of wages being systematically depressed 
and jobs becoming permanently insecure, through restructuring, poses a great challenge, 
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both to private capital and to the state. It is clear from available evidence that workers 
affected by the negative impact of restructuring endure erosion of their social, civic, 
economic and political rights which Aguiar refers to as “effective citizenship” (2006: 
452).  
 
Stiglitz (2001) also suggests that changing economic systems of reforms have affected 
the relationship between the economy and society. Given that the workers at Nkana 
Water and Sewerage company and the mining sector in Zambia now have to put up with 
longer working hours, the persistent high levels of inequality and indeed the pervasive 
poverty and squalor affecting the majority of people, clearly shows that the reforms have 
led to the erosion of social relations and destruction of social capital (Stiglitz, 2001). 
 
The decline in the welfare of workers and the reduction of workers to mere elements of 
production, thus, leads to workers developing feelings of going back in time, what 
Burawoy (2001) refers to as social involution. Burawoy writes about “a market transition 
but without the anticipated economic, social and political transformation, that is without 
the accumulation of capital, the expansion of society or the rise of a developmental state. 
This is a transition without transformation”(2001: 2). What Burawoy’s discourse on 
social involution (2001) brings to the fore, is the danger that societies in transition face 
today. This is the danger of the clock being turned back and civilization being undone by 
a few capitalists and monopoly firms. How, then, can society oppose the near-slavery 
conditions that economic restructuring imposes on it and decimation of the working class 
by capital in order to reinstate a sense of human dignity?  
 
It is clear from this study, that economic liberalisation has caused major social 
dislocations among the middle and lower classes of society in developing economies. 
While there is little evidence in the region to show that liberalisation promotes growth, it 
has been shown that liberalisation in Sub-Saharan countries like Zambia has been 
implemented at great cost to the ordinary people. As Stiglitz (2001) writes, the free trade 
policy has led to the destruction of thousands of jobs in emerging economies, which is far 
more than the jobs that have been created through foreign investment. “But in developing 
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countries with high levels of unemployment,” argues Stiglitz, “the job destruction that 
results from trade liberalisation may be more evident than the job creation, and this is 
especially the case in IMF ‘reform’ packages that combine trade liberalisation with high 
interest rates, making job and enterprise creation virtually impossible” (2001: x). 
The high level of frustration, inequality and dissatisfaction that privatisation imposes on 
the workers raises the important question on the need to reclaim the state. It must be 
acknowledged that the poor countries cannot compete with the developed world at an 
economic level. By way of contrast, the developed capitalist countries will always dictate 
terms when it comes to dismantling institutions of social and economic nature as well as 
labour laws. This ideological attack on the welfare state, leaves society and the labour 
force in a state of vulnerability and open to exploitation, abuse of conditions and 
marginalisation. In the case of Zambia, the level of disenchantment was clearly visible 
during the September 2006, pre-general election campaign when the opposition used the 
people’s suffering to gunner massive votes from the urban poor. It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that in his opening speech to the first session of the 10th National Assembly, the 
country’s President, Levy Mwanawasa, responded to the people’s disenchantment by 
acknowledging the existence of labour practices that were frustrating Zambian workers. 
Addressing the issue of employment, Mwanawasa admitted, “My government has noted 
the concerns over labour casualisation, contract labour and abuse of workers’ rights”. 
Conceding that high unemployment and poverty levels continued to be a challenge to his 
government, Mwanawasa stressed: 
“Mr Speaker, my government has noted the concerns and I am now 
directing the Ministry of Labour to immediately bring to the table, 
all relevant stakeholders, such as employers organisations and 
representatives of employees, to discuss and propose measures to 
address the issues at hand.”13   
                                                 
13 Speech by President Mwanawasa at the opening of the first session of the 10th National Assembly on 27 
October 2006, published in the Zambia Daily Mail on 28 October 2006 
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Admittedly, it would be misleading to suggest that economic reforms, globlisation or 
privatisation do not work and that they are to be blamed for everything that is wrong with 
the world. As argued earlier, globalisation and the neo-liberal agenda have chalked up 
some positive achievements which have contributed to the growth of some economies of 
developing countries but the point of departure here is the failure by governments to 
address the negative consequences. Burawoy (1999) lays specific emphasis on the need 
for the state to protect society against the market, as it administers the external conditions 
of the market. For Burawoy, “the state embodies the double movement towards market 
and social protection” (1999:16).  
 
While there are no easy answers to challenges posed by privatization in developing and 
transitional economies such as Zambia, it is useful to draw lessons from what happened 
in China and Russia in the two countries’ quest for stability and growth. While China put 
the promotion of competition, new enterprises and jobs, before privatisation and 
restructuring existing enterprises, Russia on the other hand, like Zambia, went for a shock 
therapy type of liberalization where prices were freed overnight and implemented rapid 
privatization (Stiglitz: 2002, Burawoy, 2001). The debate between the “shock therapists” 
and the “gradualists”, as Stiglitz (2002: 162) refers to them, centres largely on the pace of 
the reform. For Stiglitz, the successes in countries that did not follow IMF prescriptions 
were no accident as there was a “clear link between the policies pursued and the 
outcomes, between the successes in China and Poland and what they did, and the failure 
in Russia and what it did” (2002: 187). Similarly, Etukudo (2002) blames the failure of 
reform in countries like Zambia on lack of sequencing. Etukudo argues that many African 
countries try to, simultaneously, put in place a democratically elected government, install 
a workable economic system as well as implement privatization. Thus, sums up Etukudo, 
“it is like juggling several balls in the air while the stage on which the juggler stands 
keeps shifting” (2002: 2).  These issues are explored in detail in the next section. 
5.4 The Dynamics of Restructuring: The Missing Links 
As argued in preceding chapters, the implementation of economic reforms, particularly 
market reforms, has become the major development policy model on which African 
countries are seeking to stabilize their economies. Unfortunately, most economic reform 
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programmes prescribed for African countries whose economies are in decline have not 
led to expected levels of growth and stability. There have been and will no doubt 
continue to be, controversies on the introduction and implementation of economic 
reforms in Africa. In general terms, the need for setting economies in Africa on a 
recovery path raises no controversy, but it is the mode of implementing economic 
reforms that has been a subject of intense debate among various sections of society. 
Although it is difficult to state precisely how Africa, in general terms, has benefited from 
economic restructuring due to lack of sufficient data, casual observation shows that 
restructuring has not brought about major positive changes to the livelihoods of the 
majority of the population. Others have argued that restructuring has brought about 
economic growth in some countries, but even in such countries key questions still beg for 
answers. Although there a few countries in Africa which advocates of restructuring can 
point to as having registered growth, I argue that the social impact of this restructuring 
has claimed more casualties than anticipated.  
 
As Burawoy (2001) writes, commentators have taken “from Polanyi as they would from 
the shelves of a lavish supermarket, picking out what strikes their fancy while ignoring 
the whole” (1999: 2). In similar fashion, proponents of neo-liberal policies have picked 
out the positive aspects of economic restructuring while deliberately ignoring the social 
consequences of such programmes. Almost all countries in the Southern African region 
are going for economic liberalization, not only to seek economic renewal but to ensure 
effective integration of their economies into the global economy. It is also no secret that 
the reforms that are being introduced in different countries of the region are largely 
influenced by the thinking of the IMF, World Bank and other policy prescriptions 
hatched in the developed world. The IMF and World Bank today have a much stronger 
influence in many developing countries, where conditions are imposed for a country to 
get any seal of approval for financial assistance. But, as Webster and Bezuidenhout 
(2005) argue, these international financial institutions, until much recently, hardly 
considered the social context in which the economic reforms took place.  As a result, the 
reforms - through unregulated markets – have not benefited the poor and have failed to 
protect social services.  
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Professor Edward Webster14, who has written extensively in the area of globalisation, 
holds the view that economic liberalisation has created uneven conditions between the 
rich and poor countries, with conditions in the poor countries deteriorating. Webster 
argues that the disparities have crystallized in the widening gap between the North and 
South because the Washington Consensus emphasized more on the markets than on 
social protection. Thus, Webster stressed: 
 
“Globalisation has failed, particularly if you look at the intention of 
improving people’s lives and living conditions. There is no living 
example in the world where rapid economic reforms have worked and 
if anything, success stories have happened behind closed barriers. The 
multinationals have been allowed to expand and have become more 
powerful than the state”. 
 
Webster also questions Wolf’s (2004) thinking that globalisation has not been beneficial 
to developing countries because they have not sufficiently opened up their economies to 
the world. Webster asserts, “You have got to look at ethical and moral issues here. At the 
moment the process is unfair. If you take the example of least developed countries, the 
process is merely benefiting a few people in society leaving the majority to survive in 
poverty”.  It would, thus, be condemning developing countries to economic suicide to ask 
them to open up their economies as much as the developed countries have done, given the 
contrast in resource availability. Available data also indicates that even developed 
economies have exercised some measure of protection in terms of economic 
liberalization. The sharp criticism that has been consistently directed at the international 
financial institutions attests to this argument. Ferguson (1999) supports this point when 
he argues that since the 1990s, Africa has undergone a crash course in the most vicious 
aspects of free market capitalism while the benefits have largely eluded the continent. 
Webster is also critical of the investment policies under globalisation which he argues 
have destabilized the manufacturing base in the region. He stresses that the basis of 
                                                 
14 Author interview with professor Edward Webster of  Sociology Department at the University of  the 
Witwatersrand. 19 October 2006 
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investment is to create a strong manufacturing base, but what has happened in the region 
is the exact opposite with the manufacturing industries on the brink of disappearance. 
“The problem now is that,” argues Webster, “the state has been captured by predators. 
They are simply looting. We want more from investment other than the looting we are 
seeing”. 
However, Webster admits that the concept of fair globalisation is useful in demanding for 
a process that will deliver the expected goods to developing countries. The challenge for 
Africa now is for the continent to demand that globalisation should become more 
participatory. As the tide is now changing, Webster notes, people have realized that 
globalisation has not worked for the majority and they are beginning to question the 
primacy given to the market. Given the level of civil unrest which have characterized the 
implementation of economic reforms, it is clear that adjustment policies which were 
meant to help countries adjust to economic crises have in fact led to serious imbalances 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Thus, I argue that developing countries have been pressured into 
significantly opening up their national economies and substantially reducing protection 
but only to encounter continuing real protection of various forms in developed countries. 
Economic liberalization has, thus, created winners and losers, with the developing 
countries emerging the losers. It is obvious that local industries in developing countries 
cannot hope to attain levels of efficiency in an environment of unfair competition. As 
argued earlier, such uneven competitiveness can merely serve as fertile grounds for the 
erosion of livelihoods on a massive scale. 
It is also suggested that economic reforms have not led to expected growth levels in 
developing countries due to lack of a coherent strategy for economic growth . Those that 
chose to implement economic and political reforms simultaneously, together with 
privatization discovered later that they did not have sufficient resources to undertake such 
a massive programme. As McPherson (1995) argues, in the case of Zambia, that policy 
reform failed because it lacked prudent economic management and a pro-active approach 
to economic policy. McPherson argues that all relevant policies cannot be implemented at 
the same time by government due to lack of capacity. This suggests that the 
implementation of policy change can only be successful if it is spread out or phased while 
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monitoring the outcomes of the changes being made (McPherson, 1995). The basic issue, 
argues McPherson, is whether the phasing adopted represents the ‘next best step’ for the 
country. In Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2000) is also revealed that Zambia’s 
experience makes visible the importance of policy sequencing where, for instance, 
agricultural reforms were undertaken before macroeconomic stability was achieved and 
where financial adjustment measures were undertaken before fiscal stabilization. 
5.5 The Role of the State 
The implementation of economic reforms, particularly privatization, has reactivated the 
debate on the role of the state in promoting economic growth and development, and in a 
much broader sense, its role in society in general. The debate on the role of the state, 
continues to gather momentum, as the stark and harsh social consequences of reform take 
their toll. It is clear that privatization in Zambia has been a painful experience for the 
workers because the state has been absent. The state took a back seat and watched as the 
new owners of former state enterprises effected massive job cuts and brutalized 
conditions of service. It has been shown earlier that economic liberalization pushes 
countries into competition for industries that operate trans-nationally. The power and 
agility of capital and trans-nationals to move from one country to another with great easy 
puts pressure on regulations, sparking a ‘race to the bottom’ (Sassen, 1997, Silver: 2003). 
The role of the state today is no longer as clear as was the case in the past and the more 
states deregulate in order to raise competitiveness, the more they contribute to the 
strengthening of trans-national networks and actors (Sassen, 1997). Global capital has 
made claims on nation states and as Panitch (1997) observes, this global capital has 
escaped the state, and that it now operates beyond the state’s control.  
What then should be the role of the state in economic development? Pillay (2001) 
presents us with two scenarios. One is where the state plays “a facilitative role” and the 
second where the state plays a “directive interventionist role”. Under the facilitative role, 
according to Pillay (2001: 8), the state’s role is restricted to the provision of an enabling 
environment for the private sector and can only act where the market fails. In the 
directive interventionist role, the state’s visible hand combines with the invisible hand of 
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the market in driving economic development (Pillay, 2001). The directive interventionist 
role of the state is associated with the success story of economic development of some 
East Asian countries. Pillay (2001) posits that “in the East Asian countries, the state 
intervened extensively in order to pick winners and direct the market to achieve the 
required economic development” (2001: 8). Thus, whichever, way one looks at this issue, 
it remains clear that the state plays a central role in economic development. Stiglitz 
(2002) espouses the idea of the centrality of the role of the state, when he stresses that the 
state plays an essential role not only in mitigating market failures but also in ensuring 
social justice. For Stiglitz, there is a danger that, left to themselves, market processes 
could leave the majority of people with few resources to survive on.  
There is need for increased pressure on governments in the region to play a major role in 
issues of investment and protection of workers by strengthening labour legislation to 
ensure that jobs created by foreign investment are of a decent and sustainable nature. 
Better jobs and decent incomes for the workers in developing countries hold the key to 
better living standards. The role of the state in developing countries in ensuring that 
reforms work for the people, thus, becomes cardinal. There is need for a critical re-
assessment so that there is increased state intervention in issues of social, economic and 
political development. It is important that “the notion of the nation-state be replaced with 
that of the ‘capable state’ – a state agile in its responses to the forces of change and 
equipped with institutions which enable it to respond to its citizens’ needs” (Clapham, 
Mills, Morner and Sidiropoulos: 2001:28). What remains essential, however, is to ensure 
balance between the different economic and social values and ensure that economic gains 
are distributed and redistributed in an equal manner. 
5.6 Privatisation and Employment 
It has been shown earlier how privatisation in emerging economies leads to employment 
contraction and deterioration of social and economic conditions of labour. It has also 
been argued that privatisation has been a subject of immense controversy in countries that 
have implemented it on a large scale. Unemployment is arguably a strong feature of 
privatisation, and there are also other costs of the process that society is obviously 
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unwilling to pay. Workers, in Zambia for instance, where the majority state enterprises 
have been sold to the private sector have paid a heavy price in terms of social costs as 
privatisation has resulted in loss of jobs, the introduction of new rules at the workplace, 
longer working hours and a significant reduction in benefits. Suggestions that those 
affected by privatisation are usually left without alternative employment presents a 
serious problem of degeneration as such people are exposed to poverty and deprivation.  
The findings from this research clearly show that workers are experiencing less and less 
protection from the state in the face of privatisation. Some employers, both local and 
foreign investors, are taking advantage of the high unemployment situation in individual 
countries and the region to manipulate labour to their benefit. Employers are increasingly 
demanding labour market flexibility as a way of weakening legal requirements that 
ensure job security, protect severance packages and provide sanctuary to workers against 
unwarranted and indiscriminate dismissals. Employers in such sectors as textile, retail, 
agricultural and service want freedom to hire whoever they want and when they need 
them and fire them at any point when their labour is no longer required. This, has given 
rise to casualisation, temporal employment and other precarious forms of employment 
without any form of protection or social security.  
5.7 The Decent Work Agenda 
The increase in the power and mobility of trans-national capital has, obviously, posed 
new challenges to the trade union movement in a number of ways. The major challenge is 
the reduced role of the state in the provision of social welfare and protection of society 
against the invading capital. The dismantling of essential services, previously provided 
by the state, form part of the capital’s attack on the social standards of labour and society 
in general. As a result, the decency and dignity that was characteristic of formal sector 
employment have since disappeared. The erosion of trade union power in the region is 
evident in the apparent existence of negative labour practices throughout the Southern 
African region and beyond. Countries are revising labour legislation in order to 
accommodate demands for flexibility by investors while trade unions are being reduced 
to playing a minimal role. This has led to tensions between the state and trade unions and 
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calls for the urgent renegotiation of the social compromise that has existed between the 
two, for so many years. 
 
In calling for fair globalisation, the ILO makes it clear that states and societies “are the 
central actors in making globalisation fair in both North and South (ILO: 2004). The ILO 
suggests that well-governed countries with strong ties to strong workers’ organisations, 
employers and civic organisation have better chances of expanding the advantages of 
globalisation while avoiding the many risks. In this sense, therefore, strengthening the 
institutions of social dialogue and consultation remains a fundamental goal of 
governments in developing countries. As Amri-Makhetha of the ILO asserts, the 
ministries of labour in some countries “have continued to be marginalised in these 
process, as a result of which the decent work agenda has not adequately found its place in 
national development policies”.15  The coverage of social dialogue, as Amri-Makhetha 
observes, has thus, been limited in scope.  
 
The capacity and ability of representation of members’ interests by their organisations 
clearly raises questions, given that major issues affecting the welfare of members have 
not been adequately addressed or have not even found their way to the social dialogue 
table. Certainly, the ILO (2004) hits the nail on the head when it asserts that global 
markets are moving ahead at full speed  while economic and social institutions are 
“lagging far behind”, straining the ability of the of the multilateral system to respond 
effectively to a wide range of challenges. The importance of the multilateral system is 
also emphasised by De Villiers and Anstey (2000) when they talk of successful “social 
and economic pacts” between labour, business and government during transitions in 
countries like Sweden, Denmark and Austria, which contributed greatly to regulating 
relations between the actors over a period of decades. The success of the pacts was 
underpinned by sustained economic growth which enabled all the key interest groups to 
satisfy the needs of their constituencies (De Villiers and Anstey, 2000). 
 
                                                 
15 Speech by Judica Amri-Makhetha, ILO Director, Pretoria, at the 11th NEDLAC Annual Summit held in 
Johannesburg on 9 September 2006. 
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Trade unions are, thus, left with a daunting challenge of rebuilding their weakened 
position in social dialogue. There has been a marked decline in the quality of services 
provided by unions to their members. Faced with the pressures of economic restructuring, 
it is evident that very few unions are taking up members’ issues and developing 
innovative demands and organising strategies (Baskin, 2000). According to Baskin, this 
problem extends to the highest level where national centres and federations “frequently 
miss opportunities to influence public policies and promote workers’ interests” (2000: 
50). And as Buhlungu (2000) argues, the strategies that unions have successfully used in 
the past to achieve a number of gains for their members should serve as an important 
resource for the unions to continue to use or draw on. More importantly, domestic labour 
market responses to globalisation are based on the rationale that unions should do what 
unions do best - protect workers’ welfare in the labour market. The marginalisation of 
labour, clearly, means weakening a key component of the economic development and this 
destroys the very foundations on which economic growth is supposed to rest. 
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Chapter Six 
 Conclusion 
This research has argued that almost all the countries in the Southern Africa region have 
undertaken some form of economic restructuring, albeit at different levels. The study has 
shown that due to the poor infrastructural development and insufficient human capital in 
the region, countries have remained sources of raw material extraction for the 
industrialised countries. As noted by Webster and Bezuidenhout (2005), the economic 
profile of the region, in terms of investment and employment creation, has a mixed 
interpretation due to unbalanced growth between the developed and developing 
countries.. It is also clear from the research that some of the countries in the region, like 
Namibia, are still recovering from the legacies of colonialism and wars which left them in 
a state of disrepair. Development in such countries can only take place by levelling the 
playing field in terms of trade, technological advancement, increased investment and 
other related areas.  
This research has also shown that due to increased adoption and implementation of 
labour market flexibility policies, Zambia has recorded an increase in casual labour, 
temporary employment and sub-contracting in some sectors such as the mining sector. 
Such labour practices erode the working conditions and wages of workers. Casual as well 
as temporary workers tend to lack representation and capacity to bargain and as a result 
they are subjected to exploitation. It is important to stress that making labour markets 
flexible by removing regulations that protect the worker does not help in dealing with 
problems associated with labour market changes and neither do such practices serve to 
capture the available global opportunities.   
The findings in Zambia suggest that the IMF and World Bank inspired policy 
prescription have not resulted in growth and improved livelihoods for Zambians. It is also 
clear, from this research, that forced adjustment can have negative consequences on 
national economies and the general welfare of the people. As for the impact on labour, 
the Zambian case is instructive, where privatisation is implemented hastily in a period of 
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macroeconomic instability leading to massive job losses and social dislocations. It has 
been shown that externally imposed restructuring, without giving much attention to a 
country’s local needs, can have devastating results on the country’s economic 
performance. It is important, as Williamson (2000) argues, that emerging economies 
implementing privatisation do it right than doing it quickly.  
Economic liberalisation in Southern African countries has also opened local industries to 
high competition from South African investment, particularly in the retail, agricultural 
and service sectors. This competition has, inevitably, led to weak labour legislation in 
such countries leading to the vulnerability of labour. It is evident, that workers employed 
in South African investment companies, do not enjoy similar conditions as those enjoyed 
by their counterparts in South Africa. The case of Shoprite workers in Zambia (Kenny, 
2005) presents a classic example of the abuse such workers endure. As Kenny (2005) 
argues, Shoprite’s harsh and exploitative management is driven by cost-saving and high 
profits. Given the weakened bargaining position of workers, most workers opt to suffer 
silently for the sake of keeping their jobs. While this investment has created opportunities 
for local labour, the conditions of work under which these jobs are offered remain 
deplorable and highly questionable. The current high unemployment level being 
experienced by countries in the region, argues Stiglitz (2001), has worked to the 
advantage of capitalists by allowing them to thrive on low wages, as it puts downward 
pressure on workers’ wage demands.  
The findings at Nkana Water and Sewerage Company show that privatisation weakens 
trade union bargaining power and that managements in privatised companies prioritise 
profits before workers’ welfare. This suggests that unions have to rethink their strategies 
in order to make the transition from resistance to engagement. It requires a trade union 
movement that is not only strong in terms of muscle and membership numbers but which 
is equally strong in terms of ideas with an organisational capacity to effectively represent 
the interest of their members. This also brings to the fore, the relevance and importance 
of the kind of regulatory and institutional framework needed for employment creation, 
security of workers and working conditions. This study reveals that under increasing 
liberalisation, labour market institutions and structures are quickly losing their relevance. 
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Obviously, weak labour market structures are detrimental to effective worker protection 
and also lead to the inability of governments to strongly intervene in cases where abuse 
of workers’ rights exist.  
As Burawoy puts it, due to liberalisation, the working class is slowly losing its “powers 
of leverage” and since the “agency of the state” cannot protect society, the working class’ 
ability to organise itself has largely been destroyed even as society hangs on to its 
remnants as “the last bastion of self defence” (1999: 15).  What liberalisation has meant 
so far in developing economies, is that the state has been captured, as Polanyi (cited in 
Burawoy, 1999) argues, by a vicious and short sighted classes who are mercilessly 
pursuing their narrow economic interests as economies open up. Clearly, the weak state 
can be blamed for the predicament in which the working class finds itself under 
globalisation. The surge of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation can only be 
checked if there is a heavy presence of the state in the process of implementation of these 
measures. In the absence of a strong state, Africa’s continued integration into the global 
economy will, at best, exacerbate the high levels of poverty, exclusion, unemployment 
and inequality.  
While countries such Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland can still boast of providing 
social welfare in terms of health and education, the research found that governments are 
increasingly focusing on cost sharing in order to reduce pressure on social expenditure. In 
this sense, therefore, liberalisation of economies has led, as argued by Webster and 
Bezuidenhout (2005), to a contradictory process of “connection and disconnection” 
where basic services such as water, health and education are being privatised and pushed 
beyond the reach of the poor as countries experience cut-backs in social expenditure. The 
issue of migrant labour also remains problematic in the region as countries fail to reach 
consensus in deriving a coherent policy that will allow for free movement of people 
within the SADC region as is the case with the European Union (EU), where there is free 
movement of people within member countries.  
And as suggested by Webster and Beuidenhout (2005), there is need to “reconceptualise 
citizenship” in the region by introducing a regional social security system where migrants 
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can collect social security payments in countries where they work. The answer to this 
problem does not lie in tightening border controls but developing regional migration 
policies that will specifically deal with, among other issues, inter-governmental 
cooperation in sharing information and collecting data of labour market requirements, a 
gradual harmonization of labour and migration-related laws and ratification and 
implementation of ILO Migrant Workers Conventions. Unless strategies and initiatives 
are taken to harmonise the labour migration, emigrants – particularly the unskilled 
migrant workers who are invincible to policy makers, as they are unaccounted for, will 
painfully always find themselves in the periphery of the destination countries’ segmented 
labour market (ILO: 2005).  
It is also evident, from this study, that emerging economies seeking foreign investment, 
are under intense pressure from investors to accept their terms as a condition for 
investment. Given their weak economies, countries like Zambia have little option but to 
adopt labour market flexibility in order to attract the foreign investment. Sadly, this has 
undermined labour legislation and the protection of workers’ rights. Even where 
structures of collective bargaining exist, it was found that such structures in the region are 
weak and require strengthening. Governments should retain significant powers to 
regulate Foreign Direct Investment and to administer local policy instruments on such 
investment.   
Another issue of concern is that of declining labour standards. It is true that the speed at 
which foreign capital is settling in developing countries of the world, in search of higher 
profits, has also brought with it a number of negative developments on the labour market. 
The social consequences on workers have particularly been painful. The demand for the 
social clause to mitigate the impact of globalisation on jobs remains a hotly debated issue 
with developed countries insisting that international enforcement of labour standards is 
likely to bring distortions on the labour market and impact negatively on international 
competitiveness. However, the point developed countries seem to miss is that workers’ 
rights are human rights and that labour standards are meant to protect workers from 
exploitation by international capital in its attempt to keep labour costs low. Codes of 
conduct for Trans-National Corporation (TNCs) and promotion of labour rights through 
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debt reduction, better market access and other positive measures are among alternatives 
that can help in safeguarding international workers’ rights.  
Countries in the region should seriously begin to negotiate for with multinational 
companies on the need for these companies to adopt corporate social responsibility codes. 
These codes need to be taken by companies over and above their legal obligations to treat 
the stakeholders of the firm ethically and in a responsible manner. This is a move beyond 
the narrow view of pursuing only short-term profit-maximizing objectives to a broader 
view of greater social responsibility. Governments in the developed countries should also 
play a bigger role in promoting labour standards in developing countries, such as 
Southern Africa, by mobilising action for change through preferential trade agreements. 
Governments, trade union and employers need to address the issues of employment and 
fairness in the context of global production chains and globalisation, if labour standards 
are to be promoted.  
If globalisation does not work for the poor, it must be challenged. Globalisation is not a 
“one-size-fits-all” kind of economic process. Each country, rich or poor, needs to develop 
its own economic strategies which have the potential to bring prosperity for its people. 
Countries that are currently disadvantaged by globalisation need to formulate clear trade 
strategies through which they can derive maximum benefits instead of venturing into 
trade that only benefits the developed countries. Fair global economic practices should 
embrace concessions being given to developing countries by developed countries and the 
promotion of intra-regional trade. Fair globalisation is achievable as long as developing 
countries are given concessions and access to the international markets without much 
restriction.  
From this study, it is also clear that for people in developing and poor countries, 
globalisation has meant further impoverishment of the already poor. While it holds true 
that implemented with good intentions and on even grounds, globalisation as a process, 
would lead to improved living standards of the people in the world, the existing 
inequalities between regional and national economies have made it impossible to realise 
this goal. Globalisation should not be about developed countries reaping all the benefits 
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while leaving developing countries to make modest improvements, minor advances or 
marginal progress in their economies.  
Finally, the developed countries must revise their conception of development. Economic 
growth without social justice cannot be the idea of development. It is imperative that 
development is measured in terms of the quality of human life, which can be reflected in, 
for example, better education, health and life expectancy for every single member of 
society. This is only possible if people are equally empowered, in theory and in practice. 
Thus, the developed world has a crucial role to play in this process. Anything that falls 
short of restoring peoples' dignity, sense of identity, continuity and security should never 
be accepted.  
While developing countries need to learn to respect the dissenting voice of their own 
people, it is to be expected too, that the developed world will take heed to the concerns 
and demands of the developing world. Unless this is done, the current wave of social 
involution among populations in the developing economies will assume higher 
proportions.  
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